



Daily Report

East Europe

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Foreign Ministry Denounces Greek Campaign

LD0311200894 Tirana Radio Tirana in English 1900
GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Through a statement of the spokesman for the Albanian Foreign Ministry, it is announced that many Greek officials have commenced a propaganda campaign in the Greek mass media with regard to the draft constitution of Albania.

The Greek personalities have addressed even the international organisms. According to them the Albanian draft constitution violates the human rights, especially the religious rights. The permanent representative of Greece in the United Nations, Khristos Zakharakis, protested to the undersecretary of this organization, Rosario Green, on the draft constitution of Albania.

As the interest of the Greek officials is great, and as they try to find support in the United Nations, Albania on its part demands the United Nations Organization make the evaluations by comparing the Albanian draft constitution with the Greek Constitution concerning the Greek law on religion.

Director of Customs Service Interviewed

95P20060A Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in
Albanian 13 Sep 94 p 2

[Interview with Customs Service Director Arben Petrela by Entela Komnino; place and date not given: "The Customs Service Does Not Make Policy, Only Executes It"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Komnino] What is the current situation in the customs service today, in light of the demands made by trade activity?

[Petrela] All of us are witness to what is happening now. All the border points are open and the first thing facing the customs service has been an ever-increasing flow of goods, equipment and people. The Albanian customs service is faced with a new situation and new personnel, who need training. Also, the infrastructure conditions are not adequate. Only one or two lines are functioning over most of the land border, which makes it very difficult to handle the increasing flow. In addition, there are still no direct telephone connections with the customs stations on the border and, therefore, in many cases, it is difficult to communicate with them.

[Komnino] What kind of connections exist with the old customs stations—especially those in the neighboring countries—and with international organizations?

[Petrela] The Albanian customs service is a member of the Customs Cooperation Council (CCC) and receives technical assistance and documentation-circulation services from this council. Currently, they are working on a single nomenclature for all. In addition, there are bilateral agreements with the French, Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], and Swiss

customs services. The customs cooperation agreement [with Greece] went into effect after it was ratified by the Greek parliament. There have been other contacts, in more specific areas, between customs localities.

[Komnino] Merchants often complain about delays in customs operations, especially at the border points and, later, in the districts where customs formalities are carried out.

[Petrela] This is true. But we must keep in mind the fact that the customs service carries out monitoring for three different purposes: fiscal, economic, and defense. In regard to the latter, the customs service must carefully monitor what comes into Albania, and this must be done quickly. Subjectivism results in excessive delays, and the merchants' ignorance of the legislation contributes to this to a great extent.

[Komnino] In your opinion, what is the real situation at the customs points?

[Petrela] The longest delay might be two or three hours. Merchants receive the most conscientious service in the Qafe Thane customs station, through which 100-110 vehicles pass in 24 hours. In a regular inspection at the border points, customs agents stand between the merchant and the customs station; and the customs service carries out its work on the basis of the documentation presented. Normally, the complete procedure takes 20-25 minutes in Qafe Thane.

[Komnino] What can you tell us about the alternative of the district customs facilities?

[Petrela] Under existing legislation, the border authorities permit customs procedures to take place at the district customs station. For example, 100-110 vehicles go through the Tirana Customs Station each day. This divided procedure exists because there is no automated data-processing system and banking system.

[Komnino] How many instances of violations have been exposed by the customs service, and how have the violators been prosecuted here by the appropriate organs?

[Petrela] The cases reported deal with violations by private individuals and by customs service workers. The violations by merchants involve lack of documentation or falsification of documents and avoidance of customs fees, while the violations of customs workers involve the failure to observe the law.

[Komnino] What do you have to say about the violations?

[Petrela] The frequency of the cases exposed is linked to the work of the customs service. In the past three months alone, 15 instances of smuggling were exposed and reported in Qafe Thane. But there are problems with the implementation of the law. More assistance is needed from the prosecutorial organs. In some cases, the financial police were the ones to expose the smuggling. The customs service operates in the customs zone while the financial police operates throughout the country, including

the customs zone and the activity carried out in this zone. In regard to profiting from abuse of position, there is the idea that if you work for the customs service for only a year you will not have to work again for the rest of your life. It has happened that customs workers have been replaced very quickly and have been sentenced—including some officials. This is true in the case of a person who abuses his position. However, the recent massive replacements are linked to economic reform in the customs service, which took concrete form in the customs code approved in 1992. The fact that there are prosecutions under the law for individuals shows that there are violations of the law but, they cannot be generalized.

[Komnino] A number of articles in various press organs have criticized the customs service because the educational level of the customs worker is low and they do not know the laws. Is this true, and, if it is, are these things being corrected?

[Petrela] If there has been any abuse, it has been in favor of the subject, on the basis of the existence of certain taxes. Nevertheless, everything is in writing and capable of being monitored. In regard to personnel, the Directorate of Customs follows the criteria set forth in Article 8 [of the Customs Code] on appointment of cadres, with the requirement of at least a secondary school education and knowledge of a foreign language. We can say that more than 95 percent of those hired this year have higher education.

[Komnino] Do the customs units get anything for themselves, for restructuring and modernization, or for increasing the wages of the customs employees? Do the wages of the customs employees correspond to the work they do in bringing in millions [of leks] from merchants?

[Petrela] Up to 2 percent of the revenues can be used to improve conditions, for investments, and for the compensation of workers and, so far, the money has been used for these purposes. Specifically, a new customs house is being built in Elbasan; the parking lot is being completed in Tirana; the customs house in Fier is being rebuilt; the lighting system of the border customs stations is being completed. As for the compensation of workers with an average monthly wage of 60,000-65,000 leks, we can make up for shortfalls by payments out of this fund.

[Komnino] What is the average amount of this two percent?

[Petrela] I cannot say.

[Komnino] Is a customs worker allowed to do business on his own and is he able to obtain privileges for certain individuals and firms?

[Petrela] Business dealings are prohibited for everyone, from the lowest- to the highest-level worker. Efforts are being made to fill in gaps in the law and to handle new phenomena. Television is one of the latter. However, it must be kept in mind that the customs service does not make policy; it only executes it.

AD Issues Statement on Antireferendum Campaign

AU0311172594 Tirana ALEANCA in Albanian
1 Nov 94 p 1

["Press Statement" issued by the Democratic Alliance in Tirana on 29 October]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Democratic Alliance [AD] notes that the campaign for the referendum is being conducted in an unequal fashion and that the ruling party's propaganda hysteria is being accompanied by typically fascist acts.

1. The AD declares that the Democratic Party regime is taking every measure to obstruct our campaign. Local government authorities in the towns of Elbasan, Rreshen, Pegin, Rrogozhine, Lac, etc. have not allowed, or have delayed, reservations of halls for AD meetings and rallies.

2. AD notes that the views of political parties are reflected in an utterly disproportionate fashion in the mass media. AD has so far been given one minute and 35 seconds of airtime by radio and television, consisting of readings without graphics on two 1600 news bulletins.

3. AD denounces the revival of criminal methods used in Rrogozhine on 28 October, when open collaboration between the police, plainclothes secret service men [snikas], and Democratic Party emissaries prevented our meeting from being held.

AD will not permit any revival of the tactics used in Shkoder. AD stresses that terrorist and fascist acts and the arrogance of the regime are signs of the latter's fear of the opposition.

Unionists Called Upon To Vote Pro-Constitution

AU0311150294 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 2 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The National Council of the Independent Trade Unions of Albania [BSPSh] convened today. Discussions focused on recent political events in the country, especially the draft constitution and its approval by referendum.

BSPSh President Valer Xheka said: Considering this a key moment for the present and future, I declare that I support and condone the proposal to approve the draft constitution by referendum.

Xheka continued: We are convinced that the transformation of this draft into a constitution as quickly as possible will hasten Albania's integration into the civilized world and create a foundation and clear opportunities for reviving production and the country's economy.

He said: We are also convinced that the constitution that will result from a referendum will clearly and precisely sanction pluralism in Albania.

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Based on the above convictions, Xheka called on all trade unionists to vote in favor of the constitution, thereby sanctioning, via their vote, a better present and future for Albania.

Representatives from every district then spoke. They stressed their full support for the new draft constitution.

Union Federation Opposes Draft Constitution

AU0311172894 *Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian*
1 Nov 94 p 6

[Statement by the Confederation of Trade Unions of Albania; place and date not given: "Confederation of Trade Unions Says 'No' to the Draft Constitution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Confederation of Trade Unions of Albania (KSSH) has made known its position on the draft constitution in a statement to the press:

1. The KSSH is against many of the articles in the draft constitution being submitted to the people for approval. From the point of view of the trade unions, trade union freedoms are seriously infringed and restricted, even in comparison with current legislation. Large masses of the population—such as the unemployed and pensioners, who make up about 40 percent of the population over 18—are denied the right to organize and to express and defend their vital interests. The right to strike, one of the fundamental human rights and freedoms, is restricted, etc.

2. Every person's first right is the right to live. Work is the basis of subsistence. In this draft constitution, however, the state does not assume any obligation to employ its own citizens. Albanian working people cannot approve a draft constitution that deprives them of the right to live.

3. In contrast to a totalitarian regime, a just state gives the judiciary total independence, while, under this draft constitution, the judiciary is totally subordinate to the state and, in particular, to the president. Absolute and untrammelled power for an individual seriously damages democracy and the sovereignty of the people.

4. There are two extreme attitudes to a single problem. Although the draft constitution was not subjected to the discussion of deputies and approval by a majority of two-thirds of them, according to the draft, potential amendments (additions, changes) to this constitution call for a two-thirds majority vote of the deputies and the approval of the president of the Republic, thus arbitrarily violating the sovereignty of the people.

5. The freedom and security of the individual are not protected and guaranteed. Citizens may be detained and arrested on the basis of "certain data." This leaves room for arbitrariness.

6. In a just state all citizens must be equal before the law. This draft constitution makes distinctions in its attitude toward citizens. Although a member of the government enjoys immunity and thereby gains the opportunity to do

what he wants, not being subject to criminal prosecution without the authorization of the president of the Republic, ordinary people are left unprotected.

7. This draft constitution does not clearly define the form of the state. It is claimed that Albania will be a parliamentary republic, but in fact, from the contents of the draft constitution, it turns out to be a presidential republic.

8. This draft constitution does not find a solution for the great historical problem of the unity of the Albanian nation. It says nothing about the fate of approximately one-half of the Albanian nation, which lives outside the nation's borders.

9. The procedure for approving the draft constitution is anticonstitutional. Its approval by referendum, bypassing—in violation of the current constitutional dispositions—the parliament as the people's highest representative body, constitutes a flagrant and intolerable violation.

For all these reasons, the KSSH says "no" to this draft of the constitution, aware that it is thereby contributing to democracy and to the protection of the people's population's vital interests.

Article Examines Rugova Support for Berisha

AU0311181594 *Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian*
2 Nov 94 p 2

[Article by "B.B.": "The Socialists Demand a Change of Government in Albania and Kosova"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the last few days, the political parties of Kosova have also joined the campaign for the constitution. First Ibrahim Rugova, chairman of the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK), issued a call over state television for all Albanians to vote for the constitution. Then came the representative of Kosova in Tirana, Anton Kolaj, who asked all Kosovars with Albanian citizenship to vote for the draft. Kolaj denied the rumor that there are 150,000 Kosovars who have acquired Albanian citizenship; on the other hand, he did not give the true figure. Thus, both politicians and ordinary people who come only to trade in Albania have become drawn into the campaigns for and against the constitution.

However, Rugova's statement did not this time garner the response in Albania that a declaration by the leading politician beyond the national borders deserves. The campaign has become so embittered that "he who is not with me is against me." This is the philosophy of the campaign for the constitution. This is the philosophy of the two camps that have lined up on both sides of the Albanian electorate: the Socialists and the Democrats. This is the most savage contest in Albania's history because, if the constitution is approved, it will guarantee for a long time the rule of those who are at present in power. If it fails, however, those who wish to see a change of government will have a much easier time of it. Berisha and Rugova know this very well, as do the Socialists

who, for the first time in their existence as a party, openly attacked Ibrahim Rugova, Kosova's political leader during their rally in Peze.

Why Did the Socialists Attack Rugova?

The Socialists' attack on Rugova was not unexpected. When the government first changed in Albania in March 1992, the LDK—Kosova's largest party—and its leader Ibrahim Rugova were open allies of the Democratic Party [PD] and Sali Berisha. Rugova has never agreed to meet the Socialists or interested himself in finding out whether they too have a platform for solving the problem of Kosova. Rugova has never said a single word about the political persecution of the opposition in Albania. On the contrary, his silence has been in favor of the imprisonment of Fatos Nano and of Albanian journalists. Rugova has continually spoken out in favor of democracy and democratic processes in Albania but has always identified democracy with Berisha and the PD. In fact, he has ignored the Socialist Party [PS]. In his political naivete, he has also inherited the quarrels of Berisha and the PD in his attitude to the Socialists. RILINDJA, the newspaper supporting Rugova, which is sold in Albania, attacks the Albanian Socialists in the tones of RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE and the PD and has dug itself into the same position. However, two days ago, PS Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi accused the Kosova leader of interference in Albania's internal affairs and in the relations between the parties and the Albanian voters. Is the PS really afraid of Ibrahim Rugova's influence on the Albanian electorate? Alongside Berisha, Rugova is the man whose rating has sunk the lowest, in Albania. He is no longer Kosova's strongman but, on the contrary, the man persuading the Kosovars not to speak and not to fight but to sit waiting with arms akimbo. The Socialists know what the Albanian electorate thinks of Rugova. They know that the policy of Berisha and Rugova has cooled the electorate's national fever. The Socialists are not afraid of Rugova's influence. Servet Pellumbi's response in Peze was more for the future than for the present. Servet Pellumbi indeed said that Rugova is trying to divide the Albanians of Albania, just as Berisha divided the Albanians of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], but not even Pellumbi himself believes that Rugova carries sufficient "weight" to divide the Albanians. Rugova is failing in Kosova and cannot do any better in Albania, where nationalism seems to have fallen out of fashion and the struggle for daily bread has eclipsed efforts toward an ethnic Albania.

Why Did Rugova Speak in Favor of the Constitution?

Both in Kosova and in Albania, Rugova has headed up a blind alley. In Kosova, he proclaimed the Republic of

Kosova without in the least reckoning that Kosova would become not what he wanted but what others wanted. Rugova announced the Republic of Kosova, which nobody recognized. Gligorov announced a republic in Macedonia—but after having obtained guarantees from Europe and the United States. Macedonia was recognized, while the Republic of Kosova remains illegal. The fact that Rugova has now understood that the people's desire for self-determination does not suffice to create a state is of no importance. The will of the United States, Europe, and Russia is also necessary.

Under these circumstances, Rugova's sole ally is Berisha. Rugova thinks that the stronger Berisha is, the safer he himself is as leader of Kosova. Berisha is the only pillar on which Rugova's power rests. Rugova's call in favor of the Albanian Constitution was in fact not for the constitution but for Berisha. Rugova would have "voted" for any constitution that Berisha put forward. The approval of the constitution will extend the "political lives" of both Berisha and Rugova. More than anything else, the latter is afraid of a "trap" laid by Berisha according to "the Macedonian scenario." It would be no surprise if, after dividing the Albanians of Macedonia, Berisha were to turn to those of Kosova. It will be Berisha who will be held responsible for the fact that Albania has not done a thing to unite with Kosova in the last two years. In order to save Berisha from this more than historic responsibility, it will be necessary to find a "culprit" elsewhere. As leader of Kosova, Rugova will of course be the primary candidate. Conditions are now ripe. The quarrel within the bosom of the LDK has just begun. It is not by accident that Berisha and the PD are not taking the side of Rugova. They are waiting....

Does Rugova Think of Tomorrow?

Ibrahim Rugova does not have much time to think of tomorrow. He has no time to think that one day the government in Albania might change and the Socialists might "ascend to the throne." Rugova has gone so far in his alliance with the PD and Berisha that he cannot turn back. He has burned all his bridges as far as any approach to the PS or other Albanian parties is concerned. Of course, Rugova justifies his policy toward the other Albanian parties by the fact that the PD and Berisha have done more for Kosova than the Socialists. But this is only a pretext. Indeed the Socialists have not dealt with Kosova at all; but, not being in power, their hands are tied where discussions between governments are concerned. Kosova is more a question of governments. The question will be settled sometime, regardless of whether Albania is run by the Democrats or the Socialists. Even though the Socialists have spoken very little about Kosova in the last two years, the message of Peze was clear: They want a change of government both in Albania and in Kosova.

Gasparovic Elected National Council Chairman

*LD0311155494 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1459 GMT 3 Nov 94*

[Remarks by Deputy Tomas Cingel at the Slovak National Council session in Bratislava—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 3 November 1994, the Slovak National Council elected in secret ballot the chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic. A total of 150 ballots were issued to the National Council deputies. The commission comprising National Council deputies, which was set up for the purpose of establishing the outcome of the ballot at the constituent meeting, has found that 143 valid ballots and six invalid ballots were cast in the secret election for chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic. One deputy failed to vote. The commission has established that 104 valid ballots were cast for the candidate for the post of National Council chairman, Mr. Ivan Gasparovic.

According to Article 89, paragraph one of the Slovak Republic Constitution, the majority vote of all deputies of the National Council of the Slovak Republic is required to elect the National Council chairman.

The commission notes that the candidate for the post of chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, Deputy Ivan Gasparovic, gained the majority of votes of all National Council deputies and was thus elected chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic. [applause]

Gasparovic Speaks

*LD0311202594 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1505 GMT 3 Nov 94*

[Address by National Council Chairman Ivan Gasparovic to constituent session in Bratislava—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Dear deputies, dear guests, not much time has passed since I officially closed the 10th election period here. I said goodbye to the deputies of the National Council of the Slovak Republic and thus I closed one chapter in the history of our young parliamentary democracy.

We are meeting here again to open at this first formal meeting the first working period of the National Council of the Slovak Republic. Allow me, however, to use the opportunity to thank all those who expressed trust in me and elected me speaker of the Slovak National Council. I will try to perform this role for the benefit of the citizens of Slovakia and our state. Allow me to welcome the deputies who received the votes of electors and took the formal oath today. I believe that all the deputies of the National Council of the Slovak Republic will conscientiously and honestly perform their duties, that they will carry out the will of citizens and that, despite the varied character of political views, they will have one

indivisible aim before them—that is the prosperity and stability of the Slovak Republic. I hope that you all—and myself included—will work constructively, so that the spirit of creative cooperation may reign in parliament. The threshold we are crossing is not only the threshold of a new election season. It is a threshold that we crossed to enter a period that is decisive for our state and for Slovak citizens and we should do all we can to achieve the aims set.

The highest natural judge of deputies is their conscience. But conscience is the highest judge for all citizens. The most important part of the activity of deputies is their responsibility for the fate of the country. [passage omitted]

The composition of the National Council of the Slovak Republic is the result and consequence of the early elections. The citizens of the Slovak Republic decided in the free and democratic elections, on the basis of their own experience, their political or religious orientation, traditions or membership of a national group, how the profile of the Slovak Parliament should be defined. The elections are a reflection of the political and social differentiation of our society and the results of the elections and composition of our parliament tell us unequivocally to respect this reality. I do not want to discuss yet again whether or not the early elections had any meaning, whether they were a consequence of a political crisis or only a political destruction. [sentence as heard] I do not want to consider yet again whether or not the early elections qualitatively changed our society, whether they represented an economic, social or political contribution. Let time, historians, and political scientists judge that. For us, the deputies of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, one lesson should be drawn: We should try to constitute a parliament so that our working period is as stable as possible, so that our society is not shaken by political crises, and so that we may concentrate all our abilities on solving pressing, legislative tasks.

The results of the early elections and the composition of the National Council should cure us all of one illusion: The illusion of unity. What we knew well before, but stubbornly refused to acknowledge, has been fully confirmed, namely that Slovak society is disunited in its views, that appeals to unite forces, streams, and views are a waste of spiritual energy.

We have never been an ideological monolith, not even in the recent past, although the basic postulates of our policies were defined out of a desire for unity. The attributes of our parliamentary policy should be based on an understanding of this reality, that is the reality that we live and are politically active in a society that is very differentiated in its views. This profound knowledge of our reality makes it possible for us to be tolerant toward the views of others, to respect the human and political attitudes of others. Reality understood in this way is the key toward understanding the new philosophy, new concept of parliamentary politics.

The difference of views and political attitudes, however, does not mean a change of our strategic aims. I think that it is clear to everybody what we are striving for. Our basic premises cannot be doubted. Regardless of what the composition of parliament is, what the composition of the government will be, we must clearly declare that our society respects and professes democratic principles, that it is being transformed into a market economy, that it wants to fully integrate into European economic and security structures, that it wants and will build on humanitarian principles. There is no doubt about that. We will continue to respect all the international treaties, the charter of fundamental human rights and freedoms, parliamentary democracy. I would be very glad if these words fully and seriously penetrate the conscience of those at home who doubt it and if this could be a clear signal for abroad.

Our parliament, with its legislative and control roles, must be an unequivocal guarantee that our society will continue to develop in harmony with democratic principles and that any repetition of the totalitarian past is absolutely out of the question. [passage omitted]

In this way we should eliminate possible political crises, to stop making the population nervous and offer a prospect that will be available to everyone and for which everybody will work willingly. This is the prospect of a peaceful, stable, and prospering Slovakia. It is not an easy task, but it can be solved. If we cannot solve all the pressing problems that our society is facing in the transformation process then we do not deserve the vote of our electors.

We must not succumb to those doubting Thomases suggesting that the Slovaks are incapable of governing themselves. It takes only one step to move from such suggestions to having somebody else governing us. This way of thinking is (?clearly) unacceptable to us. Let us therefore make every effort to prove to the world, but above all to ourselves, that despite the aforementioned diversity, we are unified in our effort to create a democratic and prospering society of modern and responsible people.

It is necessary to believe that a clearly expressed common interest of the citizens of this state, the escape route from a now almost horrendous economic and social situation, will be respected by all deputies.

Politics—practical politics, as there is in fact no other politics—is the art of seeking common aims. A common aim is not set out once and for all, it is a task that is being continuously renewed in changing conditions.

If two years ago, the greatest common interest of the country was to form and build a sovereign state and its democratic institutions, nowadays such a common interest is our deliverance from an economic, social, and cultural catastrophe, from a general decline.

It would be difficult to give today a precise and exhaustive list of all the tasks we will need to tackle in the

National Council. Those problems are many and they are complex. Only a stable parliament, and of course a stable government, can tackle them.

This means that one of our first priorities should be the drawing up and adoption of the proper procedures and rules so that deputies' rights and duties cannot be misinterpreted.

Another duty of the council will be to ensure that privatization is carried out in a transparent way, to oversee privatization and facilitate its prompt and effective progress. No doubt, we will have to deal with the question of revitalizing the economy without upsetting the transformation process now taking place in our society. This also means evaluating the entire system of our credit, interest, and tax policy and more effectively promoting small and medium businesses. We face the important issue of the state budget, the passing and following implementation of which constitutes the decisive economic tool in every state. We have to endeavor to set up such legislative framework that would facilitate the faster and risk-free influx of foreign capital. In this context one has to mention the completion of our legal system along the lines of compatibility with European legal norms—a process that will make our eventual joining of the European Union easier.

We will have to tackle, in a coordinated way, problems in education, health care, culture, and agriculture, solve the problem of unemployment and curb crime. Furthermore, we will have to shape state information policy, state administration, the territorial set up, and our foreign policy.

Esteemed deputies, as you see, all this adds up to a considerable and complex task. It also calls for deputies of high qualifications, for professionals willing and able to forego their personal interests, for disciplined and cultured people possessing the right moral and professional prerequisites and prepared to compromise in the interest of common goals.

The fact that we do have common goals has been borne out by the election programs of the individual political parties and movements represented in the parliament and in fact these parties and movements themselves have a lot in common, too.

As I have already mentioned, I do not expect that the atmosphere in this chamber and this house will always be idyllic. Of course not. We have already seen, and will see again, just how complex and full of conflict the environment is that we live and will have to work in. But we do know that we carry the burden of responsibility for the fate of this state and our electorate and this knowledge should be the most important inspiration for all our words and, above all, deeds.

Esteemed, deputies, may I wish you again many successes and plenty of patience and willingness to cooperate. Thank you. [applause]

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Deputy Chairmen Elected

LD0311231994 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The election of the council deputy chairmen has been a surprise, or, in another words, almost a card reshuffle. The deputies had beforehand voted to have four deputy chairmen. However, there were five candidates for this post, but only two of them have received a clear majority of votes. They are: Agustin Marian Huska of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, and Jan Luptak of the Association of Workers of Slovakia. Three remaining deputies—Lubomir Fogas, Laszlo Nagy, and Ivan Simko—have not gained the clear majority needed for the post of the vice chairman.

Marian Andel, Slovak National Party deputy, proposed to end the election of the deputy chairmen with the provision that the two remaining posts will be allocated after the coalition talks. The majority of the deputies present accepted his proposal. [passage omitted]

New Council Members

LD0311140394 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1005 GMT 3 Nov 94

[List of new deputies taking the constitutional oath, read by Assembly Speaker Ivan Gasparovic—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] Borzova is replacing Brigita Schmoegnerova; Boris Zava is replacing Pavol Kanis; Ivan Jaros is replacing Jozef Moravcik; Vladimir Markovic of the Democratic Union is replacing Roman Kovac; Vladimir Miskovsky of the Democratic Union is replacing Rudolf Filkus; Jozef Murgas is replacing minister Peter Magvasi; Jan Bielik is replacing minister Julius Brocka; Dusan Dorotin is replacing minister Pavol Koncos; Jozef Habostiak is replacing Lubo Roman; Martin Svrabel is replacing Lubomir Harach; Anton Straka is replacing minister Tibor Sagat; Jan is replacing Ladislav Pittner; Jozef Polacko is replacing Mikulas Dzurinda; and Rudolf Chmel is replacing the current foreign minister, Eduard Kukan.

Political Right Seen as Loser in Election

95CH0008C Prague PROGNOSIS in English
12 Oct 94 p 5

[Article by Matt Welch: "Meciar Wins, Then Disappears"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bratislava—On the heels of its whopping election victory, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) stormed out of coalition talks on Oct. 4 and its triumphant leader, former Premier Vladimir Meciar, promptly went into hiding.

Meciar celebrated his impressive comeback by passing up two meetings attended by the leaders of the six other parties that won seats in parliament. His first public

appearance after casting his ballot Oct. 1 came at a press conference three days later in the offices of the nationalist, HZDS-owned daily REPUBLIKA, at which he refused to comment on his party's plans for the future.

The two-time premier was also in a minor car accident Oct. 2, when his car was hit by a German tour bus. Mirroring his stormy political career, Meciar emerged unscathed.

HZDS deputies kicked off the process of cobbling together a new government by demanding that President Michal Kovac resign. Minutes later the president, who helped engineer Meciar's ouster this spring, sent a letter to HZDS headquarters asking the victorious party to form a government, a move supported by the other six parties.

"The president stood up like a man," said Frantisek Miklosko, vice chair of the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), after he emerged from a meeting in Kovac's office.

HZDS has waged a vitriolic campaign to unseat Kovac ever since the president helped organize the March parliamentary vote of no confidence in the HZDS-led government, the act that forced the early Sept. 31-Oct. 1 elections.

As of press time, HZDS had not responded to the letter from the president, who has the constitutional duty to name a premier, who in turn names ministers and puts together a government. An HZDS spokesman said Tuesday night only that the party would not form a coalition government with either the Democratic Union (DU), which is made up largely of HZDS defectors, or the Hungarian coalition.

Days before the election, the Common Choice coalition, dominated by the post-Communist Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), was expected by many to give HZDS a fairly close race and emerge as the party in position to call the shots in forming a new government. But HZDS trounced all comers, winning 34.96 percent of the vote, compared to SDL's 10.41 percent. The Hungarian coalition was third with 10.8 percent, followed by the Democratic Union with 8.57 percent, the leftist Workers' Party of Slovakia (ZRS) with 7.34 percent, and the nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS) with 5.40 percent.

Slovakia's 150-member, single-house parliament will look like this: 61 seats for HZDS, 18 for Common Choice, 17 each for the Hungarians and KDH, 15 for DU, 13 for ZRS and 9 for SNS.

The Death of the Right

One message did come through loud and clear as the election results were released: There is no significant public support for West-leaning, pro-market reform politics in Slovakia.

Five parties out of 18 were clearly in favor of rapid privatization and decentralization: KDH, DU, the Democratic Party, the Movement for a Prosperous Czech Republic and Slovakia, and New Slovakia. Between them, they received less than 25 percent of the vote.

By comparison, parties that ran campaigns based on opposing privatization and foreign investment received 51.73 percent of the vote. If the three of those parties that entered the parliament form a coalition, some privatized companies will probably revert to state control, and the coupon privatization process, which is just getting underway in Slovakia, may be suspended.

Following the election, Western observers remained divided about whether the policies of a Meciar-led government would derail economic reform and foreign investment. One IMF official said too much progress has already been made for that, while one local diplomat predicted that the increasing momentum for foreign investment would be greatly blunted. Both, however, stressed that the key would be the new government's stability, regardless of its leaders.

Four More Years?

Even after losing the galvanizing campaign issue of Slovak sovereignty, after overseeing a declining economy, after watching 18 parliament deputies defect from the party, after constant vilification by four of its co-founders (including Kovac), after being linked with dozens of brazenly corrupt privatization scandals, and after the internationally praised performance of the interim government that took its place, HZDS lost exactly 2.24 percent of its support since the last elections in June 1992.

"New elections are nonsense," said Jan Carnogursky, chair of KDH, who has since 1990 voted twice to oust Meciar governments and force new elections. "We must create a stable government, if possible a government to last for four years."

After the elections, all seven parties stressed the need to create a government that would last. HZDS and its ally SNS have 70 seats between them, and the pre-election governing coalition of KDH-SDL-DU has 50, or 67 if you include the Hungarians. The swing vote, if these groupings hold, is Jan Luptak's Workers' Party of Slovakia and its 13 votes.

Luptak, a parliament deputy for SDL until he formed a breakaway party earlier this year, is described by DU Vice Chair Milan Knazko and several other observers as a "loose cannon." He invokes "the workers" over and over again in conversation, criticizes the existence of millionaires and faults the privatization process by saying that workers shouldn't have to purchase 1,000-crown coupon books since they already paid for the construction of the nation's industry.

"Nobody needs to explain to me how to create a functioning market economy. I had my collective. I'd get an

order and I'd build a house," said Luptak after the elections. One foreign journalist said Luptak would commonly make xenophobic statements in every interview.

But Luptak could also teach a thing or two about democracy to parties like the failed right-wing Democratic Party. With no major financing of his own, no party tradition and no other candidates, Luptak visited hundreds of factories, met with workers, and scored his 7.34 percent. Though HZDS is making attempts to cozy up to him—during an Oct. 2 television discussion, Sergei Kozlik of HZDS told Luptak: "Your party and ours are the ones that truly represent the people"—Luptak says his party wants no part of the new government. He was also the politician most critical of the behavior of HZDS representatives Olga Sosova and Ivan Lexa at the Oct. 4 meeting with Kovac.

"I think what Lexa did was just very ugly," he said. "SDL, KDH, HZDS...the leaders of these parties are all like cocks in a cockfighting ring, and meanwhile the people are still suffering. Maybe all the party chairmen should just resign."

What's Meciar Up To?

Slovakia's constitution stipulates that the president name a premier to name a government, not a "party" to hold "talks." Since HZDS has already questioned Kovac's constitutional right to call multi-party coalition talks, it is probable that Meciar will challenge the legality of the president's Oct. 4 letter.

The two men have been engaged in a bitter feud for well over a year now. Kovac, who swears allegiance to no party, warned Slovak voters against "attempts at a return to totalitarian methods" during the campaign. Meciar and other HZDS leaders have said repeatedly that they would refuse a government without Meciar as premier.

Some saw the post-election calls for Kovac's resignation as another step in Meciar's drive to exact revenge on the man who pushed him out of power. Others, though, saw it as clear evidence that Meciar doesn't want to shoulder the difficult task of forming a "stable government" and would rather stay in the opposition, where he has typically been at his most popular.

Impact of Political Instability on Economy Gauged

95CH0006A Bratislava MOSTY in Slovak 20 Sep 94 p 8

[Article by Juraj Charvat: "The Economy From Election to Election"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Every time there is a change in the configuration of the state, of the regime or government, a wave of rejection rises up: Everything preceding was bad. And so it was also when the CSFR broke up in 1992. All of the economic difficulties of Slovakia were caused, according to individual writers, by the existence

of the federation. If we had been making our own decisions, and if we had not been the losers in the federation, where could we be today, ai, ai, ai!

Two years later, in the summer of 1994, different reasoning is beginning to be heard ever more often: The economic results of the independent Slovak Republic [SR] are better than was generally expected. Measured by the per capita GDP in the SR, Slovakia is the third-best reforming country. A very low rate of foreign indebtedness gives Slovakia a good starting position in contrast to other Central and East European countries. In the medium-range and long-range outlook, Slovakia, with its level of economic development, has in some aspects better prospects for economic growth than the Czech Republic [CR]. The catastrophic scenarios of two years ago did not become reality. And so the federation did, after all, leave something here that was of economic value.

The catastrophic scenarios did not become reality, but the following was borne out:

1. The Slovak state budget does not have the money to cover some basic needs to the extent it did before, so it obviously lacks the money that previously flowed from the federal budget.
2. The incomes and consumption of the public have been limited more drastically than in CR, which is a price paid for not having hyperinflation and devaluation and for not having convertibility threatened.
3. The investment process, which lays the foundation for the future, sharply declined. Individual sectors calculated that each of them would need hundreds of billions for increased investments (railways, telephone network, expressways, arms manufacturers, agricultural industry, and so forth), but there is no available capital in Slovakia and foreign capital hesitates.

The question of why foreign capital is not coming in brings us to the issue of the subjective factor in the economy: what the leadership of the state does and what the managements of individual enterprises do. Because the assumption that Slovakia has good prospects for economic development will not be realized simply by itself, this assumption must be transformed into reality by people.

The Austrian writers' group, which also evaluates Slovakia's position without pessimism, states that, from the long-term point of view, the international competitiveness of an industry will be determined by the dynamic effects of innovations. That is where the subjective factor comes in because it will be up to people, teams of engineers and businessmen, to develop products with properties hitherto unknown and persuade demanding Western consumers to buy them. That needs a lot of expertise, a world outlook, time and money, as well as the willingness to follow the less passable road and not merely ask the state to provide subsidies and forgive

taxes. On this road, we have not yet progressed very far. To occupy some seats in the Strassbourg Parliament is not enough; that is not all there is to the slogan "Lean toward Europe."

When we leave the enterprise sphere and move into the macroeconomic or total national economy one, we find that it is tied in with the political sphere, with the activities of political parties and their representatives—that is, again with the subjective factor, with the abilities of concrete people. They create or do not create and introduce economic concepts into life.

"We have not had, in fact, a real economist or a real financial expert in our government, in contrast to the star cast Klaus-Kocarnik-Dlouhy-Tosovsky, and therefore we do not even have a clear concept of at what rate we will privatize, what we want to and what we do not intend to privatize. We have not determined the areas into which we are interested in drawing foreign capital on a massive scale. And the last is a problem not just for us, but also for foreign investors." "It is unbelievable to have had discussions here for three years at all levels, from the minister to a gatekeeper in a power plant, with various company representatives and advisers, while, at the same time, we have not decided to this day how in fact we shall resolve the question of our power-generating industry." (Both quotations from Peter Mihok, chairman of the Slovak Chamber of Commerce and Industry, NARODNA OBRODA 5 June 1994).

"Our privatization is about who is to privatize, who should make decisions about it, and who should get what piece of state property...so that some shares are not acquired by a foreign buyer and not by a domestic one, either, if he is not of their own political stripe.... Unfortunately, viewing privatization as a passing around of assets will neither bring a strategy for speeding it up nor demonstrate the merits of a market economy." (Ivan Spani, PRACA 3 September 1994).

Slovakia is a country divided into blocs with different economic concepts. None of the blocs is able to gain a convincing parliamentary majority that would make it possible to create a stable economic environment for a longer period of time. Governments take turns, and even the economic atmosphere is filled with diverse tensions. One bloc proclaims its intention to privatize the power-generating industry. Another announces during the election campaign that, if that happens, it will renationalize it. There can be nothing more damaging from the standpoint of foreign capital.

In other countries of the Visegrad Four, the situation is more stable (and, therefore, the influx of foreign capital is incomparably greater). In the CR there is a stable economic regime on the foundation of a rightist government, in Poland and Hungary after the last elections on the foundation of leftist governments (leftist in European understanding, which means that they do not change the basic economic atmosphere). The current predictions for the coming election in Slovakia do not

give anyone a chance to gain a safe parliamentary majority that makes it possible to introduce long-range economic strategy. And so, according to Ivan Spani, economic strategy in Slovakia degenerates into privatization from election to election—privatization in the sense of which bloc's members will grab a bigger or more important piece of the state's assets. The concept of accelerating economic development maybe will come after that.

Commentary: No Alternative to Broad Coalition

95CH0009A Bratislava SLOBODNY PIATOK in Slovak
13 Oct 94 p 4

[Commentary by Ivo Grycz: "Sentenced To Cooperate?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The results of the parliamentary elections showed that the direction of the Slovak people was not as revolutionary since November 1989 as the "nonpolitical politicians" of that time imagined. Rather, what emerged was the anticipated polarization of voters into those who see the transformation process as an inevitability and those who are afraid of it or even are against it. The redistribution of voters' approval was only a little more noticeable and structured. In contrast to the postrevolutionary situation, when striking personalities drew voters to their side with their idealistic vision, politicians today must respect their voter base more than ever before. And here precisely is the fundamental difference between the two political blocs that were adjudicated to us by the decision of the voters. On one side there is the victorious movement, which expects voters to adjust themselves to the ideas of Vladimir Meciar and asks for support in the implementation of specific power moves, and, on the other, are three compatible groups with traditional European political structures: the social-democratic Common Choice [SV], the liberal Democratic Union [DU], and the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]. These entities unequivocally represent in their programs their voters' will, which for them is binding. The Hungarian coalition represents a kind of microstructure; only specific nationalist demands differentiate it from the above-mentioned group. At 5.4 percent, the distinctly minority Slovak National Party [SNS] is therefore not a nation-building party, either.

A common uncertainty for both those who want to go the way of constitutional changes and changes achieved by power politics and those who represent a stable program base is the Slovak Workers' Association [ZRS]. The politicians of the victorious movement do not hide their sympathies for Jan Luptak's followers because they represent that dissenting group that does not like the social-democratic orientation of Weiss's followers or any kind

of proreform, naturally painful, policies. But even the former governing movement had to implement such policies, though often in a muddleheaded way. But Jan Luptak refuses to have anything to do with governing responsibility. He is prepared to merely sit, control, and criticize. On Sunday, Prime Minister Moravcik could only shrug his shoulders and remind Jan Luptak what the meaning of politics is. Sergej Kozlik did not get anywhere by addressing him with the familiar "thou" and insisting that, during meetings, even HZDS followers greeted the idea of cooperation with the ZRS with ovations. And so, after the initial unsuccessful courting, both camps will have to look around for another form of stability if they do not wish to become part of Luptak's folkloristic ensemble.

The greatest responsibility for forming a stable government is borne by the HZDS. Not even a coalition with the SNS and support by ZRS would provide this movement with the necessary room for governing. If the victorious movement wants to make use of its electoral strength to govern, it must come to terms with the basic phenomenon that characterized its preelection opposition tactics—guarantee the president's status, honor the mandate, and desist from expressing reservations about the current DU politicians and thus also acknowledge the legitimacy of Moravcik's government and reevaluate its program to the extent that it would become acceptable to its likely coalition partners: SV-DU-KDH. All of this opens up for the HZDS the way toward gaining nationwide recognition, but the realization of such a way has a substantial opponent in the person of Vladimir Meciar. He recently announced his resolve to sit down on the opposition benches and not allow the government to breathe. Given such tactics, the parliament would turn into a dangerous pressure cooker that could explode at any moment. Moreover, without a hope for a broader coalition, the former coalition would rather choose to use the same trench tactics of wearing out the HZDS-SNS-ZRS government. Slovakia would find itself in international isolation, to the not inconsiderable delight of our Czech neighbors.

Peter Weiss calls the idea of a broad coalition a political revolution. Well, if the HZDS were to give up attacking the president and parliamentary democracy, if it were to stop calling politicians who succeeded in being reelected traitors, and if the sense of exclusivity were to give way to a sense of coresponsibility, then let the revolution of wisdom triumph over stupidity and hatred.

[Box, p 4]

Mathematically, the election split Slovak solidarity into two equivalent parts with different faces, but, politically, the unequivocal victor is Jan Luptak with his ZRS. It will be precisely the relationship to the folkloric character of Luptak's followers that will determine the stability or, rather, instability of political conditions in Slovakia.

Army Reorganization To Begin Next Year

AU0411090194 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian
3 Nov 94 p 4

[Correspondent's report: "Army Reorganization Will Start Next Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the plans, the working group made up of experts from the Defense Ministry and from the Hungarian Army Headquarters will formulate the long-term concept of Army reorganization by the end of this year. The restructuring that started in the Defense Ministry, a restructuring also including a reduction in personnel, is already part of the aforementioned process, to be followed by the organizational restructuring of the Hungarian Army headquarters.

As we learned from spokesman Lajos Erdelyi, neither the fate of combined military district commands nor the number of organizations slated for elimination have yet been decided. It seems certain that, out of the current three district commands, namely in Tata, Kaposvar, and Cegled, there will only remain two districts. Some buildings are kept unnecessarily and some garrisons will be closed or sold. Erdelyi stressed that members of the professional staff are needed. Therefore, the planned reorganization will not lead to a reduction of these personnel.

The decided facts are the following: The number of new conscripts will drop by 2,000 in February 1995, and by 5,000 in August 1995. This means that there will be 9,000 fewer regular troops by next year, compared with the number prevailing at the beginning of 1994. Those affected by these changes will receive preliminary information and the officers and warrant officers of the units to be abolished will be offered the possibility of choosing. Erdelyi also told us that Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti will probably report to the parliament plenary session in December about the planned reorganization, Hungary's security policy situation, and the state of the Hungarian Army.

Profile, Prospects of Export Sector Analyzed

94CH0426A Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
8 Sep 94 p 3

[Article by Tibor Sult: "Foreign Trade in the First Six Months; On Whom Does Hungarian Export Performance Depend?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Indeed, who are the ones who make a difference in export performance? Do the small or larger exporters contribute more to increases in exports? What changes are taking place in the composition of exporting firms? These questions were raised by a division director of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce [IKM].

The number of foreign traders has increased as a result of liberalizing foreign trade a few years ago. Replacing the functions of a few dozen specialized state foreign trading companies, about 45,000 firms moved 2.7 million items across the border in 1993. From among these firms, about

14,000 performed export transactions at least on one occasion. As is generally the case also elsewhere in the world, the number of importers exceeds the number of exporters; exporting is centered around a not overly large number of competitive producers. In order to better reflect the relationship between exporting and production, from here on we will describe the composition of exports per domestic suppliers, and not per foreign traders.

During the first six months of 1994—the time period of our examination—about 12,000 domestic suppliers exported goods valued at \$4.6 billion. As compared to the previous year, 700 additional firms exported goods with a 7.8 percent increase in value. Considering the fact that export prices declined in the meantime, we managed to increase the export volume by 13 percent.

When ranking domestic suppliers based on value exported, we find that between January and June 1994, half the amount of the export value can be credited to 143 firms, as compared to 120 firms last year, with each of these firms exporting goods valued in excess of \$5 million. Some concentration is taking place among large exporters, and an increase in number can be seen mainly in regard to smaller firms exporting goods for less than \$1 million. The latter is consistent with the continuous increase of the number of newly registered business organizations.

We find surprisingly large changes upon examining the extent to which the various firms contributed to increased exports. During the first six months of the year, 3,276 firms were able to increase their exports in a rather dynamic fashion, by about 64 percent, while the exports of almost the same number of firms—3,216, to be exact—plummeted to almost half their previous volume. In 1994 more than 5,525 new business organizations or small businessmen became exporters, while 4,898 firms discontinued exporting. During the first six months of 1993, new exporters and firms increasing their exports made their own arrangements for only 48 percent of their exports; in 1994 the same group handled 75 percent of its own exports. All this indicates the continued, extremely strong force of the changes that have been going on for several years, and this holds particularly true in regard to small businesses. Behind the net increase in the number of exporters we find that a broader and healthy process is gaining strength, a process dictated by the domestic market, and by the real international market: New firms manifesting dynamic growth are able to take the places of firms with rapidly declining exports.

During the first six months, 78.4 percent of exports consisted of industrial products, while 21.6 percent consisted of food products. A decisive part—about two-thirds—of the growth represents increased exports of industrial products; every specialized industry branch, except the building materials industry, increased its exports. The above average, approximately 12-percent, increase in consumer and agricultural product exports is also favorable. An eight-percent decline in machinery and equipment exports, resulting mainly from the failed procurement of buses by Russia, represents a step backward.

Primarily the chemical, pharmaceutical, aluminum and steel, food, lighting source manufacturing, and electronics industry firms export the highest volume, and make large, or dynamic increases in their exports. The eight firms that sold more than \$50 million worth of goods abroad during the first half of the year, provided 12.5 percent of all exports. By producing a more than \$40 million export increment, the U.S. majority shareholder-owned Tung-ram Corporation achieved the largest increase in sales abroad. The Tisza Chemical Combine, Richter Gedeon, Borsodchem, and Chinoi not only preserved, but were also able to improve their export positions.

Along with the successors to the old, large state enterprises, new and dynamic firms operating mostly with foreign capital and technology, or performing contract work for export, also emerge in large numbers. Foreign operating capital investments amount to approximately \$100 million per month; a total of \$486 million were invested during the first five months of 1994. Some 2,073 joint enterprises with basic capital amounting to 16.6 billion forints were established between January and June, increasing the total number of joint enterprises

to more than 21,000. According to our statistics, these joint enterprises provide more than half of all exports.

Data based on performance during the first half of the year cannot provide a full picture for many reasons, because of their seasonal character, because of the hoped-for economic recovery in developed countries experiencing recession, and the export-stimulating effects of the recent forint devaluation, and finally, because of the restrictive effects of planned curtailments in export development and investment incentive funds provided by the Export Import Bank. The next opportunity to compare annual data presents itself early next year. It is encouraging that market conditions—resulting from the economic system change and a growing private sector—appear to gain strength. Under these conditions, the best firms prevail on the basis of objective criteria—firms that become increasingly competitive in foreign markets and are able to increase their exports. Notwithstanding all the above, the new vivacity of exports rests on rather fragile foundations. To truly expand exports, and to allow exports to create new jobs and help place the economy on a growth course, the government—like governments in other countries—should help strengthen new and dynamic exporters with a coherent and systematic export promotion program.

Distribution of Exports by Type of Supplier

Categories	Number of Firms	1993 Jan-Jun Exports		1994 Jan-Jun Exports		Value Index 1994/1993 in percentages
		Value in millions of dollars	Share in percentages	Value in millions of dollars	Share in percentages	
Firms with growing exports	3,276	1,678.2	39.2	2,744.9	59.5	163.6
Firms with declining exports	3,216	2,246.4	52.6	1,183.8	25.7	52.7
Firms starting to export in 1994	5,525	—	—	683.1	14.8	—
Firms engaging in exports in 1993, but not in 1994	4,898	352.2	8.2	0	—	—
Total:	16,915	4,276.8	100.0	4,611.8	100.0	107.8

Domestic Suppliers Exporting the Largest Values

Domestic suppliers	1993 Jan-Jun in millions of dollars	1994 Jan-Jun in millions of dollars	Change	
			1994/1993 in millions of dollars	1994/1993 in percentages
Tung-ram Corporation	87.4	129.1	41.7	147.7
Tisza Chemical Combine Corp.	78.2	86.9	8.7	111.1
ALCOA-KOFEM Ltd.	37.1	71.0	33.9	191.4
Richter Gedeon Corp.	64.3	67.3	3.0	104.7
Borsodchem Corp.	48.1	59.9	11.8	124.5
Dunafer Steel Works Ltd.	56.1	58.8	2.7	104.8
Chinoi Corp.	36.1	51.4	15.3	142.4
IR3 Video Int. Ltd.	27.7	50.4	22.7	181.9
Total:	435.0	574.8	139.8	132.1

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Yeltsin Issues Decree on Protection of Citizens

LD0311131994 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1200 GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The ITAR-TASS agency reports today that President Boris Yeltsin has issued a decree concerning the protection of the interests of Russia and Russian citizens in conflict situations abroad. The agency has summarized the document: Yeltsin's decree rules that in case of the occurrence of an extraordinary situation the president of Russia can take the decision on the evacuation of Russian citizens from a specific country. He can also decide on the use of force and the necessary means to conduct such an evacuation.

The Russian President's Press Office has denied that the decree is connected with the incident at the Warsaw East railroad station, where a few days ago the police allegedly beat up Russian passengers.

Explanation Sought

LD0311160494 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1528 GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 3 Nov (PAP)—According to Jerzy Szmajdzinski (SLD) [Democratic Left Alliance], chairman of the Sejm National Defense Commission, the edict issued today by Russian President Boris Yeltsin on defending the interests of Russia and its citizens abroad, requires "explanations through diplomatic channels about what it means, what kind of cases it deals with, and what lies behind it, especially as we are dealing with a state which is our neighbor."

Szmajdzinski said: "This is the first document of this kind in Europe. An explanation of this matter, possibly at a high level, is required."

Foreign Ministry Responds

LD0311173194 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1634 GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 3 Nov—According to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ], the edict issued today by Russian President Boris Yeltsin had been prepared earlier and it did not concern Poland.

"In no case could the decree concern, and it does not concern, Poland," Wladyslaw Klaczynski, head of the MSZ Promotion and Information Department, told PAP today. "We think that the edict was prepared earlier. We have no reasons to doubt the explanations by the Russian authorities on the matter," he explained.

Klaczynski did not answer the question on the coincidence in time of the calling off of the visit to Poland by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and the reasons for it.

Consequences of Postponed Visit by Chernomyrdin

WS0311124094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 3 Nov 94 p 3

[Report by Jacek Czarnecki, Danuta Walewska, in cooperation with JEN: "Yamal Gas Pipeline; Investment Will Be Implemented, Though Later"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The postponed visit by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to Poland may delay the signing of the contract on the construction of the Polish portion of the gas pipeline from the Yamal peninsula. However, postponement of the visit should not make the step impossible.

Europolgaz SA President Kazimierz Adamczyk said that even though the delay is a certain complication, the investment will begin next spring. "This will cause a certain difficulty for Europolgaz," Adamczyk told Reuter, "because without the aforementioned protocol we will have to make greater efforts in everything we do; for example, we will have to apply for each exemption or license separately."

According to Kazimierz Adamczyk, financing of the investment still remains a problem. Europolgaz proposes a credit which would call for guarantees from the Russian and Polish Governments. One of the main guarantees should be an agreement on the size of long-term gas supplies to Poland.

Meanwhile, on 28 October the Moscow KOMMER-SANT DAILY carried information that the problem of financing will be resolved at an auction; the same goes for the selection of contractors who will carry out the investment. The auction, which will select the banks that will provide the money for the suppliers of machines and for the constructors of the gas pipeline, was to be announced after the Russian prime minister's visit to our country.

Until last Friday there was still no understanding concerning tariff exemptions for materials necessary for the implementation of the investment. According to another serious Moscow daily SEVODNIA, which quoted Russian sources, all doubts regarding pipeline construction have already been dispelled. Both parties apparently wanted this done before the Russian prime minister's visit. This information was confirmed in an interview with RZECZPOSPOLITA by a representative of a company involved in the undertaking; he said that the agreement is now "flawless" and the Polish party is prepared to exempt from customs duty the materials necessary to carry out this investment.

A statement carrying similar overtones was issued on Wednesday by Grigoriy Karasin, head of the Press and Information Department of the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry. On the other hand, however, it is known that Poland is now hosting representatives of Gazexport, a foreign-trade company selling Russian gas abroad. The

Interfax agency stated that their visit to Poland is linked to some corrections which Poles have recently made in the agreement. SEVODNIA also points out that Poland would not lose much if the transaction were not carried out; Russia, however, would lose the chance of bypassing Ukraine.

Probably long-term trade contracts regarding gas supplies to Poland until 2010 will not be signed, either. Foreign Economic Cooperation Minister Leslaw Podkanski announced upon his return from Moscow that such contracts would be signed.

In line with information we obtained in PGNiG [expansion unknown], Gazprom will not sign the long-term trade contracts with Poland until all details concerning the planned construction of the transit pipeline are settled. Russian negotiators were not able to establish the form of payment for the gas. Russians want payment in an exchangeable currency. Poland, however, would prefer to pay, at least for part of the deliveries, with commodities.

Until the contracts are signed, PGNiG will import gas to Poland on the basis of contracts with Russia signed once a year.

The only long-term agreements on deliveries (not trade contracts including the price, conditions of deliveries, etc.) are the Orenburg [orenburgskie] agreement on the delivery of 2.6 billion cubic meters of gas a year (which expires in 1998), and the Yamburg [jamburskie] agreement on the delivery of 2.3 billion cubic meters of gas a year (which expires in 2006). The gas that is exported to Poland on the basis of both agreements is a payment for Poland's participation in the 1970's in the construction of gas pipelines in Russia.

PGNiG directors agree that new long-term contracts should be concluded before the two aforementioned agreements terminate (annual contracts do not guarantee the continuity of deliveries). The contracts must guarantee at least 8 million [as published] cubic meters of gas a year as early as the year 2000. If our economy develops intensively, we will need 17 billion cubic meters of gas.

Pawlak Speaks With Chernomyrdin

LD0311223394 Warsaw PAP in Polish 2205 GMT
3 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 3 Nov—Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak spoke for half an hour with Russian Federation Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in the late hours of 3 November, reported Mariusz Kosieradzki, deputy head of the Government Press Office [BPR].

According to the BPR, the conversation concerned not only the incident at the Warsaw East rail station, but also the substance of bilateral economic and political cooperation.

Former Intelligence Chief on Ties With Russia

WS0411100094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
31 Oct-1 Nov 94 p 26

[Article by Piotr Niemczyk, former head of the Polish Intelligence Department in the Office of State Protection: "Handle Russia With Care"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Russian prime minister's visit to Poland is particularly important in view of the fact that in September of this year Chernomyrdin came under attack from the opposition for his involvement in the exhumation of the Katyn graves. He personally visited the execution site and gave orders to enable the Polish group to begin work.*

The visit will most probably be dominated by issues of economic cooperation. We may expect that in an eye-to-eye discussion with the president and prime minister of the Republic of Poland, opinions will be exchanged on Poland's joining NATO and, in light of vague declarations made by the West on widening the European Union [EU] and defense structures, that suggestions may be made on the need to create a Moscow-protected security zone in Central Europe, and at least loose political and economic ties will be established (the issue has been repeatedly raised by Russia unofficially and officially).

Could this mean there exists a real threat of restoring the Warsaw Pact? Probably not in the foreseeable future. The Warsaw Pact's strength lay in outnumbering the European NATO forces in conventional arms. Considering the implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe treaty (on limiting conventional arms), the withdrawal of the Northern Military Group of the Soviet Army, and the very poor condition of Central European armies caused by budget cuts, any military pact against the North Atlantic Treaty does not make sense. Attempts at renewing a structure resembling the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance [CEMA], however, deserves far more serious consideration.

Why Is Chernomyrdin Coming to Poland?

The prime minister of the Russian Government is personally interested in economic cooperation between Poland and Russia. As former head of Gazprom and a representative of the fuel and energy complex, he is aware that without the participation of the Western neighbor it is impossible to develop Russian exports to Germany, France and the rest of the EU. Thus the highlight of his visit is to be a breakthrough in the hitherto stagnant level of trade. Foreign Economic Cooperation Minister Leslaw Podkanski claims with optimism that during the visit documents laying solid foundations for restoring economic cooperation will be signed. Most of all, the "zero option" on mutual debt, an agreement on long term energy raw material supplies and final agreements on how the "Yamal" gas pipeline is to run and other details pertaining to its construction (an

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agreement on constructing a pipeline carrying gas across Poland from deposits on the Yamal Peninsula to Germany was signed in 1993).

A joint bank consortium is to be established to simplify mutual clearing procedures—the lack of a license for Bank Handlowy was a serious obstacle for exporters who tried to collect their dues from the Russians.

Why So Long?

There has been a deadlock in relations ever since the day CEMA and the Warsaw Pact disintegrated. It began with a demand for the withdrawal of the then Soviet troops. Currently there is a conflict of interest in Poland's plans to join NATO. Russian politicians claim this is an attempt at isolating their country.

Moscow's foreign policy and, to a huge extent, Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev's personal involvement are the major reasons why no definite timetable was set for the Central European states to join NATO. The most the Kremlin could approve was the vague Partnership for Peace program, which does not provide for any calendar and which is so devoid of specific political content that it even makes room for the Russian Army.

Economic cooperation often becomes a political instrument in the hands of the Kremlin. Before the Lithuanian elections in October of 1992, one of the nails in the Sayudis coffin was the inability on the part of Vytautas Landsbergis to secure energy supplies from Russia. The voters were right, as it turned out, to expect that voting for the post communist party would guarantee that their homes were heated. Also in Ukraine, irregularities of gas and oil supplies coincide with tensions in relations with Russia. Perhaps this is why a long term agreement on energy supplies to Poland has not yet been signed.

Moscow politicians are sensitive to symbols and gestures. They probably count with scrutiny all visits paid by Polish authorities to European capitals and the United States. They saw that Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski visited Washington three times before going to Moscow. They compare how diplomatic missions are ranked. I suspect conclusions from such comparisons are not in Poland's favor.

Not Only Politics

Problems in expanding regular trade between the two states are due not only to politics. The major obstacle was an inability to solve the problem of mutual debt. Both parties agreed to the so-called "zero option," consisting in writing off all debts incurred before 1991. The problem, however, was that within the scheme Moscow financiers included Russian supplies of Orenburg gas, for which Poland had paid in kind by building a pipeline. The Russians suggested that Poland write off the debts of Soviet enterprises for equipment supplied by the Polish machine industry after January 1991, when rules of clearing in exchangeable currencies came into force. Such a solution was, of course, unfavorable for

Poland. Neither meetings between presidents nor prime ministers improved the situation. The visit of the head of the Russian Government is expected to bring improvement. This year alone it has already been rescheduled at least twice.

Poland is also partly to blame for the delay in preparing major economic agreements. The prospect of participating in the gigantic construction of the Russia-Germany gas pipeline and the enormous profits involved caused a conflict between companies interested in the undertaking. Instead of embarking on the scheduled implementation, the companies have begun to form lobby groups exerting influence on the economic ministries to outrun rivals and obtain a contract. Observing these developments, the Russians—who had declared their preferences—accused the Poles of delaying implementation of agreements and threatened they would question the participation of Polish companies in the venture. Bartimpex, the company most advanced in the implementation of the contract, has decided to take Italian pipes from the Russians, and pay for them with supplies in kind. This solution, as well as several others, has raised the doubts of other Polish entrepreneurs. Difficult negotiations on the issue may continue for some time yet.

The Risk of Profit and Loss

Long-term economic agreements will have a tremendous impact on Polish industry. Regardless of the quality of signed agreements, they will open new markets for Polish products and will secure energy supplies. One cannot, however, ignore several dubious issues.

Details of the "zero option" have still not been publicly disclosed. General comments show that the principles of mutual clearing procedures are not favorable for Poland. Our budget will be burdened with the necessity of paying for a huge part of goods produced the disintegration of CEMA. Many enterprises, working almost exclusively for the needs of the Soviet Union, had become so dependent on those exports that once the USSR fell apart they found themselves on the verge of bankruptcy. The existence of the debt by the Polish machine industry that were to be sent to the USSR on the ground of earlier agreements.

There are well-founded fears that returning to the practice of signing long-term agreements will lead to a situation we have already witnessed as the whole machine industry was endangered, which resulted, among others, in a wave of strikes in 1992. A renewal of cooperation carries with it a temptation to recover markets, but there is the threat that trade offers for other clients will be suspended.

Especially as strategic international agreements are becoming less and less necessary. While the Privatization Ministry was preparing for Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's visit to Poland, Moscow announced a

"Memorandum on Chosen Trends of the Russian Government's Economic Policy for the End of 1994 and 1994." The document states, for instance, that quotas and licenses for exports of gas and oil products shall be abolished by 1 January 1995; all customs duties on exports—by the end of 1995; and customs duties on imports are to be cut to a value not exceeding 30 percent of the customs value of the products.

The final months of 1994 and 1995 will mark successive phases of implementing the decree signed by President Boris Yeltsin on 23 May of this year. There will be no export quotas or licenses for Russian exporters of energy raw materials and customs duties for oil and gas will be decreased. If the Russian authorities decide not to resume manual control, despite the disadvantages and limitations of current regulations, trade with Russia will become increasingly easy, especially for private exporters.

Despite all odds, private trade in Russia is developing dynamically. Although there was no international agreement, trade with Russia grew by 35 percent in the first six months of 1994. Bartimpex, known for its good relations with Moscow decisionmakers on economic issues, was able to sign a contract for the purchase of billions of tons of gas, worth hundreds of millions of dollars, in exchange for food. The Lodz-based Galtex is signing huge contracts on food and textiles supplies. Such contracts by their very nature cannot be conditioned politically. How would private entrepreneurs satisfy the requirements?

Observing the evolution of mutual relations, we must keep in mind that they are overshadowed by Polish-German relations. Since the last units of the Russian Army were withdrawn from the former GDR, politicians in both countries have publicly declared that mutual relations are a top priority. Germany treats Russia very seriously, both in terms of security and economic cooperation. Their support for expanding NATO to include the states of Central Europe must be particularly bothersome for the Kremlin. Economic relations are booming, especially those pertaining to supplies of raw energy materials. The pipeline that is to run across the territory of the Republic of Poland, numerous other joint investments of Gazprom and German companies such as Ruhrgas or Wintershall, or, finally, investments in the petroleum chemistry industry in the former GDR are projects that will last many years.

No matter how the Warsaw visit of the Russian prime minister evolves, we should abandon ideas of putting up a sanitary cordon, a military, political or economic barrier between ourselves and Russia. It is in the long term interests of Poland for our Eastern neighbor to evolve, so that Russia will become a stable, rich and democratic state. And, as a full-fledged member of the international community, Poland cannot afford to isolate its Eastern neighbor or lose potential markets. This requires a balancing act: between unnecessary hostility and harmful servility.

Walesa Meets With Spanish Foreign Minister

LD0411102694 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0916 GMT
4 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 4 Nov (PAP)—On Friday morning President Lech Walesa received Spanish Foreign Minister Javier Solana Madariaga, who is visiting Poland. Welcoming the guest, the president said that despite problems in Europe there is a chance for European integration but "everything depends on our talks and our decisions."

"Europe faces many problems. We managed to get rid of some threats but new ones have emerged," the president said. "However, there is a chance for European integration, greater economic cooperation, greater security in Europe. We have a historic opportunity and I hope we take advantage of it," Lech Walesa said.

Commissioner Interviewed About 'Drawsko Affair'

MM0311155994 Poznan GAZETA POZNANSKA in
Polish 26 Oct 94 p 3

[Interview with Bronislaw Komorowski, Union of Freedom general secretary and former deputy defense minister, by correspondent Roman Suwik; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Suwik] You are a member of the Sejm subcommission that is currently looking into the so-called "Drawsko affair." In your opinion, is it just a conflict between the generals and the National Defense Ministry [MON] civilians, or could it be a manifestation of a serious clash within the "triangle of forces" among the president, the government, and the parliament?

[Komorowski] It is difficult to pass judgments before the commission's work is completed, but we can even now discuss the sources of the conflict situation. Emancipationist tendencies are common among the command structures in every armed force in the world. We also have here a tendency on the part of the Belweder to extend its own range of power, and I would also include in the picture certain natural temperamental differences among the individuals concerned.

[Suwik] But is it not rather alarming? Temperamental differences among individuals occur everywhere, and yet they are not be used to justify breaches in the rules—or, as we have seen, even formal regulations—currently in force.

[Komorowski] Indeed, there has been a marked departure from the rules set out quite clearly in the provisions of the Small Constitution and the relevant parliamentary act. Unfortunately, a situation was created in which the government abrogated its responsibility for the so-called "presidential" ministries. The reason behind it was the government's wish to avoid conflict with the president.

[Suwik] You say "a situation was created," whereas we know that it all began at the time the Solidarity-derived

coalition was in power and Janusz Onyszkiewicz held the post of national defense minister.

[Suwik] Minister Onyszkiewicz's unwillingness to enter into conflict with the president was an altogether understandable position to take. However, it should be remembered that, during his government's period of decline, that is, after the election campaign was launched, he had enough civil courage to protest against enrolling officers on the list of the electoral committee supported by the president.

[Suwik] How do you view President Walesa's role in the "Drawsko affair"?

[Komorowski] Please note that, first, as far as the military are concerned, the president's office represents a most essential, fundamental value, that is, stability. Second, in the eyes of the military President Walesa is a man who understands the Armed Forces' needs and wants to be an advocate of their interests. Finally, the case has exposed Lech Walesa's somewhat naive belief that it is possible for one person to wield control over the Armed Forces. He thought that, with an appointee of his own in the post of national defense minister, he would be able to assume total control of the situation in the military sector; however, it turned out that he was unable to prevent a crisis. Unfortunately, Walesa has shown that he is not equal to carrying out the role of a democratic head of the Armed Forces.

[Suwik] You held the post of deputy defense minister in the Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Krzysztof Bielecki, and Hanna Suchocka cabinets. Did you notice even at that time any indications of frustration among the senior officers of the Polish Armed Forces?

[Komorowski] I did note certain signs of frustration, but they were very different then. Apart from the frustration caused by economic considerations, there was unease inspired by the political situation, since the political system was undergoing a change at that time. But no empty, premature promises were made in those days. If anything was promised at all, it was promised within the limits of the possibilities obtaining at the time. Of course, there were also certain symptoms of emancipationist tendencies among the higher command structures; nevertheless, in democratic countries things like that are kept firmly within the bounds of existing regulations.

[Suwik] But perhaps political circles are afraid of telling the generals openly that over the next several years Poland will be unable to keep and satisfactorily equip the 250,000-strong Armed Forces, and that the latter will have to be trimmed down?

[Komorowski] Let me remind you that enormous reductions in the Armed Forces were already carried out after my own political camp assumed power: We reduced their numerical strength by half, and yet this was all done painlessly.

[Suwik] And now the president makes promises to the Armed Forces that the government is unable to meet.

[Komorowski] That is not true. As we know, such promises were made by Prime Minister Pawlak, who at first assured the Armed Forces that this year's military budget would be higher than last year's, then—in his inaugural policy statement—maintained only the promise that the MON budget would not be lower than last year's; we also know that the government proposal for next year's budget for the Armed Forces is even more modest than the previous ones.

[Suwik] Should we view the "Drawsko affair" as a dangerous symptom of a disease with which the democratic system of power in Poland is riddled?

[Komorowski] It is certainly very disquieting. It has not assumed the nature of a military coup, but this does not mean its seriousness should be underestimated.

[Suwik] Thank you for talking to us.

Consequences of Olechowski Resignation Viewed

WS0311141594 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
2 Nov 94 p 2

[Article by Kazimierz Groblewski and Marcin Dominik Zdort: "Who Wants Andrzej Olechowski's Resignation; Balance of Gains and Losses"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] If Olechowski resigns, the balance sheet of gains and losses among participants in the political game will be difficult to predict. It seems that regardless of the final decision, the person who gains prestige in the entire affair will be the head of the Foreign Affairs Ministry [MSZ] himself.

In an interview for the Monday issue of GAZETA WYBORCZA, Andrzej Olechowski announced that even if he did not resign within two months, he would leave Pawlak's cabinet next year nonetheless, before the presidential elections. He also stressed several times that he himself is not going to run in the elections; however, as a man loyal to Walesa he cannot stay in a government which will be so acutely attacked by his protector. "Once Walesa starts an energetic election campaign and sets up an election committee...

"I Will Not Be Able To Stay in the Government"

...the MSZ head said.

After such a declaration, politicians of the governing coalition will probably give some more thought to the possibility of Olechowski's resigning by the end of the year. There is no doubt that such a resignation would exacerbate the crisis in relations between the president and the government—it would not be easy to find a new candidate and it is worth recalling that in this case both sides must give their consent. Even though at the first moment both Prime Minister Pawlak and Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] Chairman Aleksander Kwasniewski

rejected the possibility of accepting the resignation and said that the MSZ head's decision was premature, they may still come to the conclusion that it would be better for the interests of both of them (as possible participants in these elections) and for the government if they decided on another conflict with Walesa now, rather than right before the presidential elections.

If the coalition members were able to find a common candidate for Olechowski's successor, then, perhaps, their decision would be easier. Meanwhile, there is already unofficial talk about candidates of both governmental partners—the candidates for MSZ head would be SLD Deputy Jerzy Jaskiernia and Andrzej Wiczorkiewicz, who is not a member of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] but who is linked to it. It is no secret that both sides would like to...

Increase Their Influence

...in the government, and a takeover of one of the most important ministries, which MSZ certainly is, would disturb the balance which the coalition members have worked hard to achieve.

Undoubtedly, if Olechowski resigned, the president might lose a lot. After the declarations of loyalty toward the head of state, made on several occasions in the last days by the minister of foreign affairs, Walesa cannot suspect any longer that Olechowski may be his opponent in the presidential elections. In such a situation the great popularity of the MSZ head, who is linked to the Belvedere, and the successes of the foreign policy of the Polish Republic (detailed by him in the interview with GAZETA WYBORCZA) will be all to the advantage of Walesa. The possibility cannot be ruled out that if Olechowski leaves the government, he will want to head Walesa's election committee. However, if the popular minister disappears from the political scene too early, the incumbent president may lose a few points.

No matter how things turn out now that Cimoszewicz's list has been revealed,

The Person Who Will Not Lose Is Andrzej Olechowski,

who, thanks to the fact that he submitted his resignation, has already become "the only just man" among those accused by the general prosecutor. Even if the judicial decision is unfavorable to him and if, as a result, he has to resign, everything seems to suggest that he has managed to persuade the public that despite everything "his hands are clean." Olechowski says that he does not care about political configurations, that he "is not planning another third movement." He is only scoring point. He does not conceal the fact that he does not want to have influence in political elites; he cares about public opinion, so that, as he put it, people will believe him "because this is what Olechowski said."

Now, if the MSZ head remains in the government, his position will improve quite considerably. He will be the

only minister with a "morality certificate" and the one that the coalition had to ask to stay.

Olechowski's resignation might be favorable to the opposition. The extra-parliamentary opposition is certainly counting on it, all the more so because part of the right wing has not forgotten that Olechowski's name was included in the Macierewicz list. His resignation would be bound to cause...

Another Crisis

...between the coalition and Walesa, as well as a dispute inside the governmental alliance, where conflicts arise quite frequently. Any destabilization of the present political configuration may result in earlier parliamentary elections, for which some rightist leaders already seem to be hoping.

If Olechowski resigned, the turmoil within the government and the dispute between PSL and SLD might also be taken advantage of by some "elements" of the Freedom Union [UW], which are still counting on a turnaround in the coalition. Even though officially the politicians of the center of UW consider the possible resignation of the foreign minister to be unfavorable to Poland's interest, they are probably glad that any politician that they consider "reasonable" finds it difficult to cooperate with the present coalition and that Olechowski's prestige might cease to support the Pawlak cabinet.

Early in his term in office, Andrzej Olechowski...

Struggled with the Coalition,

mostly with SLD. He stated that representatives of the coalition will be allowed to assume deputy ministerial posts only after MSZ is reorganized. "I have begun work on modernizing the ministry. Once that is concluded, I imagine that there will be room in MSZ for people representing a given political configuration. The point is, however, that every time a new coalition comes, the entire government should not change," he said. SLD wanted its deputy minister in MSZ. PSL made no claims because Olechowski had promoted Stanislaw Szymanski, PSL member and an employee of the diplomatic service for many years, to an undersecretary of state (deputy minister) position.

Jerzy Kozminski, who in the Suchocka government was an undersecretary of state in the Office of the Council of Ministers, became the first deputy of Minister Olechowski and was promoted to secretary of state. He was placed in charge of the team of people working on the MSZ reform plan.

Tension Maintained

...around MSZ. It was heightened by criticism from some SLD deputies, who criticized former Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, focusing on his personnel policy. In that dispute, Minister Olechowski supported

his predecessor in office and so there came attacks on him. All the more so because some officials who had been fired under Minister Skubiszewski decided that they had been recalled contrary to the law and appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court. [passage omitted on history of conflict over MSZ]

Olechowski was involved in the defense of the Vatican concordat. He criticized the appointment of Marian

Zacharski to the head of the intelligence services. [passage omitted]

He tendered his resignation when he found his name on Cimoszewicz's lists. According to Cimoszewicz, Olechowski violated the law of 1981 on remuneration of people holding key offices in the state, because he chaired the Supervisory Board of Bank Handlowy. He withdrew his resignation after Prime Minister Pawlak expressed doubts whether this interpretation of this law is correct.

Serbian, Romanian Officials Discuss Relations

*LD0311214194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2056
GMT 3 Nov 94*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bucharest, Nov. 3 (TANJUG)—Romanian and Serbian officials said Thursday the two peoples have remained friends despite pressure being put on Romania and other neighbors to sever ties with Yugoslavia.

A delegation of the Serbian information ministry, headed by Minister Ratomir Vico, said in talks with Romanian Secretary of State in charge of European integration Gheorghe Prisecaru that the unjust sanctions against Yugoslavia were seriously affecting its neighbors.

The officials said everything should be done for an immediate lifting of the sanctions, which would open scope for bilateral cooperation, particularly economic, but also in other spheres.

The Serbian delegation is paying a one-week visit to Romania at the invitation of the Romanian Government to discuss media cooperation after the easing of the sanctions against Yugoslavia.

The United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro in late May 1992, for alleged involvement in civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In recognition of Yugoslavia's efforts in the quest for a peaceful settlement of the Bosnian conflict, the UN Security Council suspended some of the sanctions in early October, relaxing the ban on international traffic, sports and culture.

The Romanian side expressed a readiness to begin exchanging information and video clips as soon as possible. Romanian officials said international media were still distorting the truth about Romania and Yugoslavia.

The two countries' officials said that, whatever foreign press might say, Romanians and Serbs were a part of the European reality and would participate on an equal footing in European integration processes, with due respect for the national characteristics.

Party Urges 14th Army Withdrawal From Moldova

*AU0311162794 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in
Romanian 1400 GMT 3 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] The standing bureau of the National Romanian Unity Party [PUNR] has today sent us the text of a draft resolution on the pullout of the 14th Army of the Russian Federation from the territory of the Republic of Moldova, a draft initiated by PUNR Senator Adrian Motiu, PUNR representative of to the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe.

We reproduce the text of the document:

Among the numerous events that took place after the Cold War ended, the pullout of foreign troops from the territories they used to occupy is worth mentioning. As a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, with the exception of a few zones where they are still present, the Russian Armed Forces and its allied troops have left their bases and returned to their countries of origin.

The undersigned, members of the Parliamentary Assembly, cannot ignore the fact that the 14th Army of the Soviet Union was intended to invade and occupy half of West Europe and the Mediterranean countries. Now that the Warsaw Pact belongs to the past, and considering the fact that the Russian Federation has announced its candidacy to become a full member of the Council of Europe, it is perfectly normal that the aforementioned army should be, if not dissolved, at least pulled back far from its attack positions. As a matter of fact, the 14th Army is currently stationed on the territory of an independent state that has also applied to join the Council of Europe.

The draft resolution forwarded by the PUNR to the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe points out: Assessing that the continued stationing of that army on the territory of Moldova is extremely surprising, if not even cause for concern, we request that the parliamentary assembly decide that the return of that army to Russian territory should be one of the prerequisites with which the Russian Federation must comply in order to be admitted to the Council of Europe.

Izetbegovic Discusses Lifting of Arms Embargo

AU0311144794 Paris AFP in English 1419 GMT
3 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Nov 3 (AFP)—The threat to lift an international arms embargo and allow the Bosnian Government to rearm could force separatist Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic said Thursday [3 November].

Speaking here after talks with visiting U.S. Senator Richard Shelby (Dem. Alabama), Izetbegovic said "the threat of lifting the arms embargo, if such a decision is taken now with implementation delayed for six months, might make the Serbs change their attitude towards the peace plan."

More than 30 non-aligned nations are to propose to the UN General Assembly later Thursday that the Security Council exempt the Moslem-led Bosnian Government and its allies, the Bosnian Croats, from the arms embargo slapped on all of former Yugoslavia in 1991.

A vote on the non-binding resolution is expected Thursday or Friday.

And the United States is slated to put a similar proposal to the Security Council on Monday, calling for the automatic lifting of the arms embargo in six months time if the Serbs by then have still not accepted an international partition plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina which would give them 49 percent of the territory, compared to the 70 percent they now hold.

"We hope that maybe such a threat to lift the embargo and provide us with weapons come spring could bring the other side to change its attitude and negotiate," Izetbegovic said.

If this failed, the Moslem-led army would continue to fight, the president warned.

Foreign Minister on Arms Embargo Resolution

AU0311213194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1843 GMT 3 Nov 94

[Interview with Irfan Ljubijankic, foreign minister of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic, by Senada Cumurovic; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Cumurovic] The latest successes of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army will definitely, beside the military consequences, also have political consequences. In the context of these successes, one can also see the perfectly candid stance of Paris, London, and especially Moscow on one side—which is nothing new—and the stance by the United States on the other. Mr. Ljubijankic, how do you assess the political consequences of these events?

[Ljubijankic] The political consequences of this could be viewed in two ways. First of all, from the viewpoint of our country's position in the talks, which has doubtlessly

improved following the successes on the ground. Any success by our Army improves our negotiating position. Second, we must view the political consequences at a global level as a possible change in the behavior of the most responsible international political factors that influence the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in short, the Contact Group. You have singled out the polarization, which is nothing new and which was not produced by the successes of the Bosnian Army. This polarization is, naturally, determined by other factors, by the realistic and geostrategic interests of the countries that [word indistinct] the resolution of our crisis. Everybody is fighting for his little share of interests in Europe—Russia, Great Britain, and France alike. The United States, on the other hand, as we all know, has been supporting us in a rather balanced and stable fashion from a considerable distance throughout these two years.

The United States has already spoken against any sort of punishment of the Bosnian Army. The United States favors lifting the arms embargo, and the United States hails and congratulates the successes of the Bosnian Army. We had the opportunity to experience a little bit of this atmosphere during today's meeting with the U.S. senator, with whom I had the opportunity to talk. Therefore, not only is the United States satisfied, but it actually congratulates us on the successes of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

[Words indistinct] and the opposite stance, the former superpower Russia holds a different view and is very much concerned by the military successes of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. Russia will definitely do everything in the United Nations and in bilateral contact to halt these successes in one way or another, that is, to convince the international community that the Bosnian Army must be stopped. The views of France and Great Britain are very similar to the Russian view, although not as explicit, however, it is definite that, as a result of these successes, France and Britain will champion a reluctant stance by the international community toward the pace in Bosnia and will continue to confuse the situation and avoid naming not only the culprit for the war, but also the culprit for the rejection of the peace plan.

[Cumurovic] You have also mentioned the Contact Group, which, beside the aforementioned countries, also includes Germany?

[Ljubijankic] You see, the Contact Group does not have a coherent (?stance). It consists precisely of the countries of which I have spoken earlier. These differences in a way define the position of the Contact Group, that is, they are a measure of the Contact Group's failure. On the other hand, we must have Russia, which is the only one capable of influencing Serbia. Therefore, the Contact Group, regardless of its, I would say, complications in taking a stance and implementing what is agreed, still has a chance to try to steer the peace process in a direction in which some results could be accomplished.

[Cumurovic] The UN General Assembly is expected to discuss and, according to the current assessments, also pass a resolution on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Can we expect more from this resolution than from a string of earlier ones that have also touched on the principles reaffirmed by this resolution?

[Ljubijankic] We have been witnesses to numerous UN Security Council resolutions that were not implemented. Among these I would single out Resolution No. 752, which is the key resolution and whose implementation would have definitely, if not completely neutralized the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, then considerably curtailed its duration. With this resolution, the international community bound Milosevic to withdraw heavy arms [words indistinct]. Naturally, new resolutions followed that were not implemented and gradually the United Nations' credibility, at least regarding the implementation of resolutions, has melted away among our people and in the international community. Of course, we cannot deny certain positive effects of the UN engagement—UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces], the airport, (the humanitarian aid), and the protection of Sarajevo.

This resolution merely affirms all earlier UN resolutions. It reaffirms the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign, indivisible state community and as an international subject. It gives Bosnia-Herzegovina a right to the future, even though perhaps only a declarative one, and even though perhaps one cannot find anything more than a mere declaration in this resolution. This resolution will not change the pragmatic views of the international community and various political factors that somehow shape Bosnia's fate. However, it will in any case reaffirm the legality of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state. Within this framework and for such a UN session, (this is sufficient). It is good to reaffirm this, not only in the United Nations, but also in the CSCE, which is expected to meet at the highest level in Budapest in December, as well as in other international forums [words indistinct] regular annual meeting of the countries of the Central European Initiative, a member of which Bosnia-Herzegovina is. Therefore, all these final documents and resolutions by international forums help strengthen the legal position of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this is a great advantage for us. I am convinced that our enemies would be very content to have at least a little piece of this legality from the international community that we have.

Srpska Official Blames U.S., Germany for War

AU0311120694 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
3 Nov 94 p 3

[Interview with Srpska republic "Foreign Minister" Alexander Buha by Norbert Mappes-Niediek; place and date not given: "Foreign Minister of Serbian Bosnia: 'We Want Part of Sarajevo'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Mappes-Niediek] You have now been under a total embargo for almost three months, you

have lost your best friends in Belgrade, and the Bosnian Army is attacking. Are you now prepared to accept the Contact Group's peace plan?

[Buha] No. We above all criticize that the plan was not fully developed and there were no negotiations on it. The Contact Group was here twice, then they drew up their map. However, a peace plan has to comprise an agreement on the cessation of hostilities, a map, a document on mutual recognition, and one on the lifting of the sanctions. The Contact Group only drew up the map, but they did not finish it.

[Mappes-Niediek] Because Sarajevo was left out?

[Buha] Not only because of that. The formula of 49 percent for us and 51 percent for the Muslims and Croats cannot only refer to territory. What about the wealth of the country, with its factories, cities, and communications? According to the land registers of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, 63 percent of Bosnian territory belong to the Serbs. What we have now may appear to be much, but it is little: We have perhaps 20 to 25 percent of the wealth.

[Mappes-Niediek] And you want 49 percent?

[Buha] Well, perhaps everything would look different if we got part of Sarajevo. This would make a big difference.

[Mappes-Niediek] Do you actually have a counterproposal to the plan of the Contact Group?

[Buha] Yes, we have one. We want a union along the lines of the European Union. The people and the territory are sovereign. We want both, but we do not want to be only a sovereign people in a federal state.

[Mappes-Niediek] Do you want a state of your own or a union with the rest of Yugoslavia?

[Buha] If the others have the right to form a confederation with Croatia, we want to be able to form a confederation with Yugoslavia. A federal state within Bosnia is out of the question for us; at best there can be a confederation. This means: We are independent, we have our own seat in the United Nations, and we can leave the confederation at any time. We want to have our own international relations, currency, foreign trade, and army.

[Mappes-Niediek] What use is the right to join Yugoslavia if Yugoslavia does not want it?

[Buha] Yugoslavia will want it.

[Mappes-Niediek] Did Milosevic believe that he would be able to change your mind when he broke with you in early August?

[Buha] He certainly did.

[Mappes-Niediek] Will you now form a union with the Croatian Serbs?

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[Buha] There will be a union with the republic of Serbian Krajina sooner than with Yugoslavia. The educational and the legal systems and the state symbols are similar.

[Mappes-Niediek] Did you actually expect Milosevic's embargo?

[Buha] Not in such a drastic form. We were shocked.

[Mappes-Niediek] Do you still regard the Russians as advocates of the Serbian cause?

[Buha] Yes, but they have enough problems with their own affairs. They are very quiet in the Contact Group. On the other hand, the Americans and the Germans are good patrons of the Muslims and Croats. Apparently, above all the Germans are excellent advisors.

[Mappes-Niediek] You are the foreign minister, but your country has no contacts with the outside. What are you actually doing?

[Buha] I meet, for example, journalists or study the UN resolutions. This can be very instructive.

[Mappes-Niediek] Your president, Radovan Karadzic, seems rather busy. For example, he has just been in Banja Luka for a full week. What did he do there? Crack down on the gang that has now been arrested?

[Buha] There was a group of former members of the people's army, deserters, but also high officials and people close to the government who concerned themselves with theft, robbery, and the violent expulsion of people from their apartments. However, the president was not in Banja Luka because of them.

[Mappes-Niediek] But what was the reason?

[Buha] From time to time, a president has to play to the people; they want to hear, see, and touch him.

[Mappes-Niediek] Are you hoping that Milosevic will disappear?

[Buha] We are certainly closer to the Belgrade opposition politicians Djindjic and particularly Kostunica. But one never knows how the people will vote.

[Mappes-Niediek] When will there be peace in Bosnia?

[Buha] When the United States wants it.

[Mappes-Niediek] You mean that the United States does not want peace?

[Buha] No. The Americans have commitments toward the Islamic countries that finance Izetbegovic. Petrodollars are at issue. We are only a negligible quantity for the Americans. However, the Germans have also interests here.

[Mappes-Niediek] What are they?

[Buha] They have invested so much in the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal that it will only be profitable if they can control the entire length of the Danube.

Reportage on Kupres Front Combat Situation

Muslims, Croats Join Forces

LD0311140194 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1257 GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Petrovac, Bileca, Doboj, 3 Nov (TANJUG)—Armed clashes are continuing on the Bihac-Krupa and Kupres fronts while the Blue Helmets are actively helping the Muslim side in the Gorazde area, TANJUG correspondents report, citing sources in the Srpska republic army [VRS].

The command of the Second Krajina Corps has reported that attacks by the Muslim army's 5th Corps on the Bihac-Krupa front have been thwarted. Units of the VRS 2d Krajina Corps have routed strong Muslim military formations and completely encircled some of their units.

The same source claims that combined Muslim and Croat forces are continuing their forceful and coordinated attacks from several directions on the Kupres front and are backed by heavy artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and tank units.

The situation on the Kupres plateau is difficult because the attacks against Serb positions have been joined by units of the regular Croatian Army—the 4th Guards Brigade of Split and the 114th Brigade of Omis—on orders from Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.

There are many dead and wounded on both sides on the Kupres front, where the Muslim army's 7th Corps is fighting alongside units of the Croat Defense Council and the Croatian Army, with strong backing from artillery and armoured units.

Members of the 2d Krajina Corps are putting up valiant resistance in the fighting for the defense of Kupres. The command of the VRS Herzegovina Corps claims that Serb positions between Mostar and Nevesinje and around Konjic are exposed to heavy mortar fire.

The same command has pointed out that the preparations for fresh Muslim attacks against Serb defense lines are being carried out "in full view of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] members."

Muslim forces have intensified their attacks on Serb positions and villages in the wider Doboj area as well.

HVO Reportedly Enters Kupres

LD0311145094 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] According to unofficial reports, units of the Croat Defense Council [HVO] have entered Kupres. In the course of the three-day fighting on the Kupres plateau, the HVO liberated around 250 square km of the area. [passage omitted]

7th Corps Enveloping Kupres

*AU0311154294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 3 Nov 94*

[Report by Razija Mehic from the Kupres front]

[FBIS Translated Text] After two and a half years under occupation, the eastern, northern, and northwestern parts of the Kupres commune have been liberated. The infamous chetnik strongholds, the points Stozer and Greda that dominate the Kupres heights, are now in our hands.

And that is not all. The fighters of the 7th Corps, led by their commander, General Alagic, have found the key to the little and big doors—Kupreska Vrata [door to Kupres] are in the hands of the golden lilies of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 7th Corps.

The units of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] are also successfully advancing from the south.

The chetniks are in total chaos as the 7th Corps goes forth.

Kupres Liberation Confirmed

*LD0311172794 Mostar Croatian Radio Herceg-Bosna
in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 3 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bosnian Croat Defense Ministry's political department has just sent a report that officially confirms that Kupres has been liberated. The report says:

After 30 months of Serb occupation, Bosnian Croat forces entered the town of Kupres from several directions at 1320 today, and liberated the entire 600 square km area of the Kupres municipality.

Three members of the Croat Defense Council [HVO] were killed and another six wounded in the fighting for the liberation of Kupres. Large quantities of Serb weapons, ammunition, and equipment have been captured.

Vladimir Soljic, defense minister of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, and Major General Tihomir Vlaskic, the chief of the general staff of the main command of the Croat Defense Council, have sent congratulations to all members of the HVO taking part in the operation code-named Cincar for their courage and professionalism and called on refugees from the Kupres area to begin returning to their homes.

Radio Reports Kupres 'Liberated'

*AU0311194894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 3 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Esteemed listeners, directly prior to the program, we have received reports that the fighters of the 7th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the units of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] have liberated Kupres. At the same time on Bjelasnica and

Treskavica Plateaus, the soldiers of the 1st Corps have conquered new important strategic installations and seized considerable quantities of ammunition, arms, and means for communications.

Serbs: Kupres Situation Uncertain

*LD0311195794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in
Serbo-Croatian 1827 GMT 3 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Petrovac, 3 Nov (TANJUG)—The information service of the Srpska republic army 2d Krajina Corps this evening reported that the offensive launched jointly by the so-called 7th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, Herceg-Bosna's Croat Defense Council, and regular units of the Croatian Army is still raging.

According to the 2d Krajina Corps information service, the situation in the Kupres area is highly dramatic and uncertain.

The same source said that general mobilization was introduced at 1200 today in Livno, Tomislavgrad (formerly Duvno), Suica, and Prozor. The aim of the mobilization is the recapture of the Kupres plateau by the Croats before the Muslims do it.

Confirm Croat Units in Kupres

*LD0311210694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in
Serbo-Croatian 2035 GMT 3 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Drvar, 3 Nov (TANJUG)—Units of the Army of the Republic of Croatia and the Croat Defense Council have entered the town of Kupres, Serb military sources in the combat zone and representatives of Kupres civilian authorities confirmed in a statement to TANJUG this evening.

Fierce fighting is still in progress in the town; combined Croatian forces are firing artillery at exclusively civilian facilities.

The Serb sources said that the civilian population was evacuated from Kupres in time.

1st Corps Takes Mountain Areas Near Konjic

*AU0311134994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 3 Nov 94*

[Report by Zvonko Maric and Jadranka Milosevic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Military operations in the theater of Operations Group 1 of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 1st Corps on the Bjelasnica and Treskavica plateaus are still under way.

Over the last 24 hours the chetniks have launched two heavy artillery and infantry attacks on the newly established defense lines of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. Both attacks were repulsed and the clashes resulted in the liberation of new strategically important facilities on

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these mountains. Fresh quantities of weapons and equipment have been seized—eight 80-mm mortars, 12 [word indistinct] M-2, [word indistinct] machine guns (?M-63), communications equipment, small arms, automatic weapons, and a considerable amount of ammunition, which the chetniks left in the woods as they fled before the fighters of our army.

Bodies of aggressor soldiers have remained on the slopes of Bjelasnica and Treskavica. Among them are Drazenko Sopalic from Banja Luka, Zeljko Petrovic from Loznica, Dragan (Circic) from Sarajevo, Dusan (Stanic) from Belgrade, Vitomir Zegoja from Dobro Polje, and Rade Elez.

In yesterday's fighting, 1st Corps units captured three chetniks, one of whom was a member of an enemy sabotage-reconnaissance group. He said, among other things, that—following the extraordinary successes of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army fighters on the Bjelasnica and Treskavica plateaus—panic had spread among the Serbian population in Trnovo. The Serbs were packing up and wanted to leave, but their military and civilian authorities would not let them go.

As of the filing time of this report, very fierce fighting is taking place on this front. All the newly established lines held by the fighters of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 1st Corps are firm.

Reportage on Bihac Area Combat Situation

Serbs Check Offensive

LD0311174694 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1725 GMT 3 Nov 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Petrovac, Nov. 3 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Serbs routed strong Muslim troops on the Bihac-Krupa front in northwestern Bosnia, and encircled several Muslim units, Bosnian Serb army sources said Thursday.

The sources said a strong Bosnian Serb counteroffensive on the Bihac front continued pushing back the Muslim Fifth Corps in the upper part of the Una River and on the Grmusa-Grabov plateau, northeast of Bihac.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees figures show that more than 11,000 Serb civilians have fled their homes before a three-pronged Muslim offensive mounted from the U.N.-declared "safe area" of Bihac two weeks ago.

The offensive was mounted in the directions of Krupa, northeast of Bihac, Petrovac, south, and Kulen Vakuf, southeast of Bihac.

Bosnian Serb Army sources said joint Bosnian Muslim-Croat troops continued several-pronged heavy attacks

on the Kupres front in central Bosnia, using heavy artillery, multiple grenade launchers and tank units in the attacks.

The situation on the Kupres plateau is extremely difficult, because regular Croatian Army troops, the Fourth Split Guards Brigade and 114th Omis Brigade, have been ordered by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman to join Muslim attacks on Bosnian Serb positions.

Bosnian Serb army sources said the battles on the Kupres plateau had inflicted heavy losses on the Muslim, Bosnian Croat and regular Croatian Army troops which are using artillery and armored units in attacks on the Bosnian Serbs.

The sources said Bosnian Serb defenses near Mostar and Nevesinje in central Herzegovina and near Konjic in northern Herzegovina, had come under heavy mortar fire.

The sources said Muslim troops were preparing for new attacks on Bosnian Serb defenses before the very eyes of the U.N. Protection Force.

Bosnian Serb army sources said early Thursday Bosnian Serb forces repelled a heavy Muslim infantry attack on the strategically-important Nisici plateau, 20 km north of Sarajevo, reporting no losses in personnel.

Only 'Days' Till Area Recovered

LD0311193894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1831 GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 3 Nov (TANJUG)—The Muslim offensive on the Bihac front has been crushed and it is only a matter of days before all the territories occupied over the past 10 days or so by units of the so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina Army will be returned in full, the information service of the Srpska republic army announced in Petrovac.

Although there is no precise information about the battles, the information service states that Muslim forces were today forced to withdraw and count their losses.

Unconfirmed Missile Attack

AU0411080694 Paris AFP in English 0144 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Nov 4 (AFP)—Bosnian Croat and Moslem forces Thursday [4 November] said they had captured the town of Kupres, in the southwest of the country, and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic sent his congratulations to the Moslem [Bosnia-Herzegovina Army] 7th Corps. [passage omitted]

In other reports of fighting, Bosnian Government sources said secessionist Serbs operating in Croatia had launched a new missile attack on the Moslem enclave of

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Bihac in western Bosnia late Thursday. But United Nations officers stationed in the pocket could not confirm the report.

Major Fikder Saddiqui Alam of Bangladesh, a UN officer, said only that an afternoon Serb missile attack on Bihac had injured seven people, six of them children. Two warehouses and six homes were also damaged, he added.

In his message of congratulations following the reported capture of Kupres, Izetbegovic said: "This victory of yours lights the way towards further liberation of other occupied parts of our country." [passage omitted]

The town sits on a 1,190-meter (3,930-foot) high plateau of the same name that overlooks roads running north and south, a branch of which runs to Travnik and Sarajevo. [passage omitted]

Serb Artillery Attacks

*AU0311155894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 3 Nov 94*

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic from Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Text] The chetnik missiles are targeting the centers of Cazin and Bihac, and—since the heavy shelling is under way as we file this report—it is impossible to get detailed information on the consequences. New material damage is evident as are wounded civilians in the streets of the town.

Today has been characterized by intense chetnik attacks on the entire defense lines of the 5th Corps and the residential areas here. These attacks are also continuing from the so-called Serb autonomous province of Krajina. It is obvious that Martić's Serbs in Croatia are paying no heed to the constant warnings from the UN Protection Forces.

Let us also add that all the defense lines, particularly the newly established ones, are firm and stable, and the 5th Corps fighters will not allow for any surprises.

UNPROFOR Warning

AU0411093894 Paris AFP in English 0913 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Nov 4 (AFP)—The UN force here has strongly protested to secessionist Bosnian and Croatian Serbs following attacks against UN-protected Moslem-held towns, a military spokesman said Friday [4 November].

Authorities in Pale, the Bosnian Serb stronghold, and Bosnian Croat forces in the breakaway Krajina region of Croatia "have been warned of the possible consequences" of their latest artillery and missile attacks, UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] spokesman Major Herve Gourmelon said.

This follows the firing Thursday of at least seven missiles, believed to be SA-2 anti-aircraft missiles used as

conventional artillery, against the towns of Bihac and Cazin in the west of the country and the explosion of an 82-mm shell in the Sarajevo Moslem-held suburb of Hrasnica.

The protest was sent to both Bosnian and Croatian Serbs as it was not clear which side had fired the missiles on Bihac and Cazin. There was a possibility both sides were involved.

Bihac town and Sarajevo are two of the six UN-declared safe areas in Bosnia which UNPROFOR has vowed to defend from shelling attacks. A similar protest was sent to the Bosnian Serbs on Sunday following earlier shelling of Hrasnica in which at least one civilian was killed and several wounded.

Thursday's attack on Hrasnica damaged the roof of a house. There were no reported casualties. Details of damage caused in Bihac town and Cazin were not immediately available.

Serb shelling attacks, which have also targetted other Moslem-held towns including Velika Kladusa in the west and Bugojno in central Bosnia, come in the wake of a government-led offensive which has netted over 250 square kilometres of territory, along with the town of Kupres in the southwest of the country.

Bosanska Krupa 'Nearly Surrounded'

AU0311133894 Paris AFP in English 1313 GMT 3 Nov 94

[Report by Francis Curta]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Nov 3 (AFP)—Fighting raged on at least three fronts in Bosnia-Herzegovina Thursday [3 November] as Russia called on the UN Security Council to stop an escalating offensive by Moslem-led government forces against the Serbs.

UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) reports remained sketchy and radio stations of the warring sides gave little indication as to the scale of battles underway. [passage omitted]

Reports in Sarajevo suggested the main areas of fighting were in the north, centre and especially the west, notably around the Serb-held town of Bosanska Krupa, which Moslem-led government forces appear to have nearly surrounded.

UNPROFOR military spokesman Lt.-Colonel Tim Spicer said the United Nations had managed to set up an observation post overlooking the city. This had confirmed heavy firing in the northeast and southwestern parts of town, with the centre remaining quiet.

But Moslem-led forces appeared to have the upper hand, with Spicer saying that under present battle conditions the United Nations believed the town would fall to them within 10 days.

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Meanwhile, a 10-minute heavy artillery barrage Wednesday afternoon further south, near Valiki Radic, suggested an infantry assault had then been launched, Spicer said. It was not known which side was attacking. The area concerned is located within recently conquered Bosnian Government territory.

There were also unconfirmed reports of secessionist Serb forces from neighbouring Croatia moving to reinforce the Bosnian Serbs, Spicer said.

The Croatian Serbs have been shelling Moslem-held towns from across the border, but have denied sending troops into Bosnia to assist their Serb brethren.

Meanwhile in central Bosnia, a second offensive has seen Moslem-led forces attacking Kupres plateau in a south-western direction, Spicer said, adding however that they had made no progress towards capturing the town of the same name. British UN forces in nearby Gorjini Vakuf told AFP that the Moslems were advancing along a 14-kilometer (8.5 mile) wide front in hilly terrain, while Serbs shelled the nearby town of Bugojno. Spicer said at least four surface-to-air missiles, fired against ground targets, fell in Bugojno Wednesday. Damage appeared to have been slight.

Bosnian Croat forces continued to head north towards Kupres, Spicer said, but it was unclear whether they had yet joined in a pincer movement attack on the town.

UN spokesman Major Herve Gourmelon on Wednesday said the Bosnian Croats had already been in action south of Kupres, as was reported by the radio stations of all three warring parties. [passage omitted]

In the north, there were small probing attacks by Moslem forces around Gradacac, along with artillery and mortar firing near Dobo, Spicer said.

Thursday morning, UN spokesmen spoke of increased artillery, mortar and machine gun fire northeast of Tuzla.

Meanwhile, Moslem troops were also continuing to attack Serb positions to the southeast of Sarajevo, apparently progressing towards a main road which they had not yet managed to cut.

UN Detects Serb Artillery Fired at Sarajevo

AU0311142894 Paris AFP in English 1401 GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Nov 3 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs Thursday [3 November] fired three shells over Sarajevo, causing neither damage nor injuries, according to reports here.

UN spokesman Major Sol Koos said UN-operated cymberline radars had detected three artillery rounds, possibly mortar, fired Thursday morning from Serb-held Vojkovici, three to four kilometers south of the city.

The shells were fired in an east-west direction, he said.

The Bosnian Army, for its part, reported three mortar shells falling Thursday morning in Vis, a mostly barren hill to the northwest of town.

It was not immediately known whether these were the same three shells detected by radar.

The UN has warned it would take military action if there were shelling of the city, though it failed to do so when several mortar shells impacted on a Moslem-held suburb at the weekend, killing at least one person and injuring several more.

Sarajevo Attacks Continue

LD0411105994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0953 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pale, Nov. 4 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Serb forces on Thursday repelled several strong Muslim attacks in the region of Mts. Bjelasnica and Treskavica, south of Sarajevo, Bosnian Serb military sources said.

The sources said the attacks had been aimed at breaking through from the zone under United Nations protection on Mt. Bjelasnica into the depth of the Serb territory south of Sarajevo.

After heavy fighting throughout the day, Muslim units returned to their original positions inside the zone that should be under the control of U.N. peacekeepers.

In the afternoon, Muslim forces in the U.N. demilitarized zone on Mt. Igman, also south of Sarajevo, opened strong sniper and machine gun fire at Serb villages of Grlica and Vojkovici, said Serb military sources in Pale, the political center of the Bosnian Serb republic.

In the afternoon and evening hours, Muslim troops also opened fire on Serb parts of Sarajevo.

'Fierce' Serb Shelling Reported on Zvornik Front

AU0311155794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 3 Nov 94

[Report by Nijaz Banjanovic from the Zvornik front]

[FBIS Translated Text] It has been true hell on the free Zvornik territory. At about 1020 the aggressor started fierce artillery attacks from all available weapons at the villages on the entire free territory. The shelling is in progress at the moment of filing this report.

A number of 155-mm and 122-mm howitzer batteries, tanks, hill guns, recoilless guns, and mortars of all calibers from all the Chetnik strongholds on the surrounding hills have been engaged in the destruction of the remaining standing houses in Sapna, Vitinica, Kovacevici, Kobilici, Zaseok, Nezuk, Medjedja, and Godusa. The material damage is immense. We have still not received any information on possible casualties.

Despite all this the defense lines of the 206th Chivalrous Brigade are stable and firm.

UN Forces: Government Forces 'Massing Near Olovo'

AU0411100294 Paris AFP in English 0945 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Nov 4 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic said he expects to declare a state of war throughout his territory Friday [4 November] at a meeting of the Serb supreme command in its Pale stronghold, Radio Pale reported. [passage omitted]

Moslem-led troops were now reported to be massing near Olovo, north of Sarajevo, UN Protection Force spokesman Major Herve Gourmelon said Friday. [passage omitted]

"We will start the most decisive battle against the enemy," Karadzic was quoted as telling Pale media. [passage omitted]

He acknowledged that his forces had not reacted immediately to the latest government-led offensive, notably in the west of the country, "but we did it on purpose so as not to be accused of conquering somebody else's territory," he said.

Army, HVO Inflict Serb Losses on Doboj Front

AU0411102794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 4 Nov 94

[Report by Mirudin Aldobasic from the 7 South Operations Group Information Center via the 3d Corps Press Center]

[FBIS Translated Text] The aggressor is again demonstrating his impotence on the innocent population in the Tesanj region and the free territories of Doboj and Teslic. In the first hours of the night he fired several dozen shells at the defense lines on the Doboj front, after which he targeted the villages on the free Doboj territory, particularly, Matuzici, (?Franci), and a part of (?Karuce). Fortunately, no one was killed but the material damage is immense.

In the early morning, the Mt. Ozren chetniks attempted infantry breakthroughs in the Maklenovac region; however, joint units of the 203d Glorious Motorized Brigade Doboj-Bosna and the 110th Croatian Defense Council [HVO] Brigade Usora successfully repulsed the Chetnik attacks, and in a counterattack pushed the enemy back to his initial positions. The enemy suffered losses in manpower and equipment.

The defenders were overnight also successful in repulsing enemy attacks in the region of Vucari and (?Live) on the Tesanj front.

Serb Zavidovici-Vozuca Front 'Stronghold' Taken

AU0411112094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 4 Nov 94

[Report by Bosna Operative Group Press Center via the 3d Corps Press Center]

[FBIS Translated Text] The main feature of the last day on the Zavidovici-Vozuca front was the extensive movement of the aggressor's hardware, motorized columns, and troops. Sporadic powerful anti-aircraft and small arms provocations were also reported, while 82-mm mortar shells landed on Cvetik, Kolotin, and Podmalovan. There was also intensified activity of chetnik snipers reported. During the night the chetniks fired 20 82-mm mortar shells at (?Grojiste). This was supported by small arms and sniper fire.

During the evening, 120-mm and 82-mm mortars, Bofors, and anti-aircraft guns targeted Maglaj town center. This was the chetniks taking out their impotence for the umpteenth time on the innocent population. Dozens of destructive shells also landed on the defenses in Ulsinjak and [words indistinct], and the surrounding Maglaj villages. Two citizens of the Maglaj free territory were injured.

The chetnik combat activity died down during the night, but they continued to bring in hardware and manpower. The defenders responded forcefully from their firm defensive positions and destroyed an enemy stronghold, killed two, and incapacitated five chetniks.

Izetbegovic Congratulates 7th Corps on Victories

LD0411091294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2300 GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] While touring our defense lines on Mt Bjelasnica, Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, received a report on the successes achieved by units of the 7th Corps. In this connection, he sent a message of congratulations through the Corps commander, Brigadier General Mehmed Alagic, to all soldiers and officers belonging to the units that managed to achieve this great success. The message says:

Brave fighters of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, your victories are not a result of our supremacy in weaponry, because the aggressor still enjoys great supremacy both in quantity and quality of weapons. You have been victorious thanks to your ability, courage, and your love of Bosnia, of your people, and of freedom. The history of liberation struggles has many times shown that the army with a brave heart wins.

You, soldiers of the 7th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, have just proven this. Therefore, I would hereby like to express my admiration in addition to all congratulations. Be convinced that your victory today illuminates the path of the further liberation of

occupied parts of our country, President Izetbegovic's message of congratulations says.

Izetbegovic, Delic Visit New Front Lines

AU0311202694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, visited our new front lines in Bjelasnica and Treskavica this afternoon.

President Izetbegovic met with soldiers and commanders and visited the lines held by the following units: 1st Bosniak Brigade, 82d Foca Brigade, partially 4th and 5th Motorized Brigades, 1st Glorious Brigade, and 2d Chivalrous Brigade.

President Izetbegovic was accompanied by Chief of General Staff, General Rasim Delic.

Federation President Zubak Hails Kupres 'Success'

LD0311223894 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and president of the Presidential Council of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, who has himself spent the past three days on the Kupres plateau, said the following for Croatian Radio in connection with the liberation of Kupres:

[Begin Zubak recording] Today we achieved one of the political and military goals that we had set for ourselves. Our final political goal is the return of all Croat refugees to their homes. We have always made efforts to resolve the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis in a negotiated way, through peaceful means, but it is obvious that the Bosnian Serb leadership is reluctant to accept such a solution, and we are actually forced to achieve these goals in a military way, which is our legitimate right. As you know, we have expressed our readiness that the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina should be ended in a peaceful way.

I am convinced that the success we have achieved today will be a fresh impetus to all the Croatian Defense Council forces to achieve our future political and military goals—as I said before—the liberation of territories where the Croats have lived for centuries. [end recording]

General Calls on UN To Stop Serb Attacks

AU0311171494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 3 Nov 94

[Report by Muhamed Mujic from Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Text] A regular meeting of the representatives of international organizations on the territory of the Bihac district with Mirsad Velagic, plenipotentiary of the government of the Republic and Federation

of Bosnia-Herzegovina, attended by Brigadier General Atif Dudakovic, commander of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, was dedicated to the latest successes in the liberation of territories from the aggressor and to the grave humanitarian situation in this part of the country.

Informing the representatives of international organizations, Gen. Atif Dudakovic, among other things, emphasized that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army was forced to decide for a counteroffensive, because the protected zone of Bihac had been under [word indistinct] aggressor's offensives, while the Chetniks from the notorious stronghold of Grabez had been mercilessly killing civilians on the streets, destroying the economy, and devastating the town for over two years, with the whole world watching.

In a counteroffensive, the soldiers of the 5th Corps liberated 250 square kilometers of the occupied territories and, in this way, pushed away the aggressor's long-range weapons, which posed a constant threat to this town. In this way, they have actually created more normal living conditions in Bihac and this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

According to Gen. Dudakovic, great quantities of ammunition of various types, tanks, numerous vehicles, and other military hardware was seized in this operation.

The lines reached on the battlefield are under complete control even though Karadzic's Chetniks are constantly receiving reinforcements from Knin. In the operation by the 5th Corps, several enemy soldiers from the so-called Serbian Krajina have been seized while the Chetniks have been bringing reinforcements on the state border with our republic from the UN Protected Areas [UNPA] and shelling Bihac, Cazin, and Velika Kladusa. If the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] does not (?thwart) the attacks from the occupied Croatian territories, then the 5th Corps will be forced to protect parts of the Bihac district from the aggressor's attacks from UNPA zones with radical means.

The humanitarian situation in the Bihac district is very grave as all roads to Bihac via the so-called Serbian Krajina have been closed. Since May, not a single food convoy has reached the town.

Today, Mirsad Velagic, plenipotentiary of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation Government, again proposed supplying this town from the air to at least somewhat alleviate the difficulties of the residents in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has been totally surrounded by the aggressor for more than two and a half years.

SDA Views Military Successes, Western Reactions

AU0311175594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 3 Nov 94

[Mladen Bosnjak report on regular news conference by the Party of Democratic Action, in Sarajevo on 3 November—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Reporters were briefed shortly and concisely by Edhem Bicakcic, one of the vice presidents of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA], and Enver Kreso, president of the SDA club of deputies in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly and president of the club of Bosniak deputies in the Federal Assembly.

With congratulations to the soldiers of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, the SDA believes that these conquests did not come as a surprise. The party will continue to help (?within its limits).

Mr. Kreso emphasized that it would not be wise to create an atmosphere of expectation of new major and rapid successes.

The inclusion of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] units [word indistinct] liberation of the territory on the Kupres plateau is welcome and another sign of resuscitating trust between the two armies that had fought until yesterday. As Mr. Bicakcic emphasized, the process of restoration of mutual trust requires time as well as [word indistinct]. Therefore, the pressures to include the HVO units into the activities of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army overnight could also be counterproductive.

Regarding particular views of the most influential countries in the international efforts to restore peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it has become evident after the latest successes of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army that England, France, and Russia have a negative stance toward these successes. They are playing an open hand now, and it has become crystal clear that the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina, the failed plan to create the Greater Serbia, and the Russian ambitions to reach warm seas through Greater Serbia all fit into the political and other interests of these countries.

Contrary to the policy of these countries stands the support that the majority of countries, especially the United States and Turkey, offer to the just struggle for the liberation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

SDA Vice President Edhem Bicakcic said that political talks of the SDA leaders with HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] leaders in Rotulje near Tesanj have coordinated numerous aspects of political discord and dilemmas concerning the setting up of the Federation. He believes that now is the time to realize what has been agreed. Mr. Bicakcic anticipates the creation of conditions for the return of Bosniaks and all other refugees to the territories inhabited by them beforehand, the formation and full functioning of SDA offices where they do not exist currently—this should happen between 14 and 19 November—and the beginning of activities by the SDA and the HDZ at cantonal level and [words indistinct] territorial formation of communes [words indistinct] residents.

Karadzic Hints at Republic-Wide 'State of War'

LD0311193294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1823 GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 3 Nov (TANJUG)—Serbs in the Srpska republic will be brought into the

situation of not handing over even an inch of their country to the United Nations, said Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, speaking in Banja Luka today.

He added that the example of Mt. Igman showed that the international community was working for the benefit of the Muslims.

Because of such a situation, Karadzic hinted at introducing a state of war in the entire territory of the republic. The state of war, quite a new situation from the legal point of view, was introduced in several municipalities in western parts of the Srpska republic situated in the zone affected by the latest Croat-Muslim offensive.

The introduction of the state of war in the Srpska republic had been discussed on several occasions, but it had always been postponed.

President Karadzic said that the latest Muslim offensive—in which HVO [Croatian Defense Council] units are involved—clearly showed that Izetbegovic and his leadership were not abandoning the armed occupation of the entire former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Karadzic stressed that because of all this the acceptance or nonacceptance of the Contact Group's peace plan had no effect on the fundamental goals of the Muslim authorities in Sarajevo.

To Proclaim State of War 4 Nov

LD0311222294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2151 GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 3 Nov (TANJUG)—Srpska republic President Radovan Karadzic stated this evening that the Supreme Command of the Srpska republic would at its session tomorrow "probably proclaim a state of war throughout the republic."

In a statement for a Srpska republic TV news bulletin, Karadzic, who was in combat uniform, explained that the proclamation of the state of war would mean launching a decisive battle against the enemy.

The Srpska republic president spoke about the situation in the field, saying that the Srpska republic army in the area of Kupres had withdrawn to tactically more favorable positions in preparation for defense and a subsequent counteroffensive.

Karadzic said that the Serb side has always had a constructive approach toward peacekeepers and that "UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] cannot guarantee anything when it comes to the Muslims."

"For this reason, we demand that the Muslim side disappear from the demilitarized zones. If it does not, we shall be forced to fight with both hands. Up to now, we have been fighting with only one—the left one," said Karadzic.

Commenting on the Croat-Muslim coalition, the Srpska republic president spoke of a possibility that Bosnian Croats would join the Serbs when they realize that the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna had no chance to survive without the Srpska republic.

"In the latter case, Bosnia could be divided in two parts between Serbs and Croats, with the Serbs getting Tuzla and environs, and the Croats getting Zenica and central Bosnia," said Karadzic.

He added that this would be a "favorable outcome for the world and for Europe" and unfavorable for the Serbs in Bosnia since any kind of Muslim autonomy within a Serb state would be a "source of instability and conflicts."

Predicts 'Decisive Battle'

AU0411080494 Paris AFP in English 2228 GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Belgrade, Nov 3 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic said Thursday [3 November] the Bosnian Serbs were facing a "decisive battle" against joint Bosnian Government and Croat forces who launched a joint offensive against Serb-held positions.

"We are going to take part in a decisive battle against our enemies who, by refusing to accept a political settlement and launching offensives, have forced us to destroy them militarily," Karadzic said in the northern town of Banja Luka. [passage omitted]

The Serb leader's remarks, reported by the Serb news agency SRNA, monitored by AFP in the Serbian capital Belgrade, followed a joint Bosnian Croat and government attack on the Serb-held town of Kupres, in the southwest of the country.

The joint forces said they had captured the town Thursday and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic sent his congratulations. [passage omitted]

Karadzic: Muslims Cannot Change Situation by War

LD0411091894 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2140 GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Radovan Karadzic [Srpska republic president] was the guest of this evening's television news from Pale. The leader of the Bosnian Serbs was wearing a camouflage suit and in his calm voice he tried to belittle the successes of the units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and Croatian Defence Council [HVO]. The main culprits, as Karadzic sees it, are the Americans:

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] Mr. President, according to many analyses from different quarters, the indications are that, perhaps, behind all these military offensives by the Muslims there lies some

tacit agreement of the Western powers, who think along these lines, and say the Muslims have been given a certain period to do something, to try to do something about the maps which they could not achieve at the negotiating table.

[Karadzic] There is something to that. Certainly the European countries, including even Germany, are not interested in the defeat of the Serbs, particularly not to the advantage of the Muslims. Germany would perhaps like us to be defeated by the Croats, but not by the Muslims, because it knows the danger a Muslim state would pose for Europe, particularly if it is a large one. However, every war has an ending, one way or the other.

Europe cannot endure such a war for long and it will at some point demand an end to this war, but until then time has certainly been given to the Muslim side to make some improvement to their miserable territorial position, and we must prevent them, we must thwart them, in order to show the international community that the Muslims are not capable of changing the picture on the ground. They may have a success in one place, and we will in another and a third. We will wipe out their success in a few days. However, overall they cannot change the situation by war. [end recording]

War Crimes Commission Gathering Evidence

AU0411093994 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 29 Oct 94 pp 4,5

[Interview with Mirsad Tokaca, secretary of the State Commission for Gathering Evidence on War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Jasminka Saric; place and date not given: "War Criminals Must Be Brought to Justice"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The destiny of the International Tribunal in The Hague is in our hands! This statement by Mirsad Tokaca, secretary of the State Commission for Gathering Evidence on War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, runs counter to the general view that it is not very likely that the Hague tribunal will produce any results.*

[Sabic] What makes you say that Bosnia-Herzegovina is the one to shape the destiny of the tribunal?

[Tokaca] In our political activities, in many aspects of our life, we tend to shift responsibility to others, blame others for our own lack of success, especially with regard to the diplomatic activities of the international community. The international community has turned its back on us, there is no denying this, but we cannot use that as an excuse. The work of the tribunal largely depends on the quality of documentation that we send to The Hague and how we gather evidence about the crimes and the war criminals. The more legal validity a piece of evidence has, the less the chance that the guilt will be hushed up, mitigated, or altogether eliminated.

The Tangle Has Started to Unravel

[Sabic] Still, the present situation in international politics makes it highly unrealistic to expect that

Milosevic—and new permutations by the Contact Group on the internal organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina suggest even Karadzic—will be on the list of Bosnia-Herzegovina war criminals!

[Tokaca] It is, indeed, unrealistic to expect that the top echelon of war criminals will be tried among the first cases that are scheduled to begin in November this year. In my opinion, the prosecutor will begin from the middle of the list and move upward. That is how to start unraveling the tangle and, once it is set in motion, there will be no stopping it. Consequently, I am convinced that some day, sooner or later, Milosevic will be put on trial. He is a shrewd politician, he knows how to protect himself, and he still has a powerful lobby in international diplomatic circles. However, we must not forget one thing: There is no statute of limitation on instituting legal proceedings, especially not for arraignment on charges of genocide. The interests of world politics change and I am, therefore, convinced that the time will come when those interests will sacrifice Milosevic. In 10 or even 30 years. We will not forget what happened and will be ready to act and bring these war criminals to justice.

[Sabic] Karadzic and the Pale leadership?

[Tokaca] They are small fry and we hear they are already preparing their defense in case of arraignment. They know that we are gathering evidence against them and that their freedom of movement will be very restricted once warrants for their arrest are issued. Hence the mysterious news of people suddenly disappearing, of disobedient associates, witnesses to crimes being liquidated, capital being transferred to countries that are willing to accommodate war criminals on the run. Those people are now doing everything to prolong the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for the longer it lasts, the more protection they will have from the tribunal. However, the war is bound to end some day, and then they will flee and find refuge in countries all over the world. It will be up to us to locate them.

Until Today—17,000 War Criminals

[Sabic] Does the State Commission currently have legally sound and valid documentation on war criminals at its disposal?

[Tokaca] I cannot talk about the documentation that we have already sent to The Hague, as the defendants would know what to prepare for their defense, and Western democracy gives the maximum rights to the defendant including even hardened criminals. All in all, we have put together about 7,100 cases, with documents and more than 6,000 eye witnesses to war crimes and war criminals. We have carefully processed, classified, and stored on computer more than 3,500 cases. The evidence

gathered so far incriminates 17,000 individuals. Those who devised or carried out crimes will be tried for 338 registered mass murders to which eye witnesses will testify, 50 mass graves, 352 concentration camps in which people were killed and tortured, 450 villages burned to the ground, 300 mass deportations and ethnic cleansing, 43 occasions on which prisoners were used as "human shields," 25,000 rape cases.... There is a long list of reasons why the architects of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina must not go unpunished.

[Box, p 5]

Only \$30,000 Has Been Spent

Serif Bassouni's commission, which was gathering evidence of war crimes committed on the territory of former Yugoslavia before the tribunal started work, spent \$1.32 million for more than a year and collected more than 50,000 pages of evidence. For twice that period, our commission has cost the state a little over \$30,000. That complies with our resolute view that criminals must be brought before the international tribunal!

Serbs: NATO Airdrops Aiding Muslim Offensive

*LD0311180394 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske
Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1630 GMT
3 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The resumption of parachuting humanitarian aid from NATO aircraft is directly connected with the latest Muslim offensive on Serb defense positions and territory, TANJUG has learned from high-ranking circles of the Srpska republic army.

According to the same source, this operation, known as Parachute, is to be resumed today following several months of interruption because of the alleged humanitarian aid airdrops over the territory under Muslim control, primarily to the enclaves Gorazde, Zepa, Srebrenica, and Bihac. It was said that the Serb side has firm proof that this officially humanitarian mission was grossly abused in the past for supplying ammunition, weapons, and military equipment to the Muslim side in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It was also said that by resuming the airdrops, the pro-Muslim circles in NATO wish to help the Muslim offensive in which huge quantities of ammunition have been used. However, this has been openly opposed by certain high-ranking UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] officers because their forces have increasingly frequently become a target of the Muslim formations's attacks with the simultaneous launching of a real media witch-hunt against the blue helmets and some of their commanders, the Srpska republic army says. [passage omitted]

Officials Resume Talks With 'Secessionist Serbs'

AU0311143094 Paris AFP in English 1410 GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Nov 3 (AFP)—Croatian Government officials and secessionist Serbs from Croatia's Krajina region Thursday [3 November] resumed talks on restoring economic ties between the two sides at Knin, the Serbs' main city, UN officials announced.

A first round of talks was held in the Croatian capital a week ago, seven months after the Croatian government and secessionists signed an internationally mediated peace accord.

The Croatian delegation was headed by President Franjo Tudjman's chief of staff, Hrvoje Sarinic, the former secret police chief.

The Serbs were represented by their "prime minister" Borislav Mikelic and their "foreign minister" Milan Babic.

The co-presidents of the Yugoslav peace conference, David Owen for the European Union and Thorvald Stoltenberg for the United Nations, also attended the talks, according to a spokesman for the United Nations Protection Force reached by telephone from Zagreb.

Owen and Stoltenberg were assisted by their deputies, Geert Ahrens and Kai Eide, as well as the U.S. and Russian ambassadors to Croatia, Peter Galbraith et Leonid Kerestdzhiyants, respectively.

Croatian Serbs have controlled one-fourth of the former Yugoslav Republic's territory since the outbreak of secessionist violence in 1991. They are seeking to secede Croatia to join forces with Serbs from neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina and possibly Serbia proper which now is part of rump Yugoslavia.

The talks were expected to focus on a reopening of communication links including the Zagreb-Belgrade motorway and repairs of water and electricity mains between the two sides.

Sarinic Interviewed Following Knin Talks

LD0311204694 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 3 Nov 94

[Interview with Hrvoje Sarinic, head of the Croatian delegation to talks in Knin, by unidentified announcer at the HTV studios in Zagreb—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] The Croatian delegation has returned from Knin following talks with local Serb representatives from the occupied areas of Croatia. Hrvoje Sarinic, the head of the delegation, is our guest in the studio. Good evening, Mr. Sarinic. Can you tell us, first, with whom you had talks—and, of course, about what?

[Sarinic] First, this was a difficult, strenuous, tough meeting. We had talks on the basis of a document that was drawn up by the conference on former Yugoslavia. The entire international community was present there: Lord Owen; Mr. Stoltenberg; two ambassadors—Mr. Eide and Mr. Ahrens; U.S. Ambassador Galbraith and Russian Ambassador Kerestdzhiyants. The delegation of the local Serbs was led by Mr. Mikelic, who was accompanied by Babic and his aides.

As I have just said, the meeting was very difficult and very tough, but what is important is that the documents on the basis of which we proceeded in the negotiations contained a preamble—an introductory provision to the document—that emphasizes that all the talks to be held must be held within [respect for] all relevant UN resolutions. Naturally, all these resolutions confirm Croatia's sovereignty in those occupied areas. All these talks must be conducted, the Croatian delegation insisted, within the framework of the fact that this is the beginning of the process of reintegrating the occupied areas.

Of course, I do not want to say that this was accepted wholeheartedly. However, this is a firm position that was defended by the Croatian delegation. I can also say that we were supported by the international community in this respect.

[Announcer] In the eight hours of talks today, as always, you started with a discussion of the economic issues.

[Sarinic] We did indeed start with economic issues—but as you know, these economic issues cannot be separated, whether one likes it or not, and we insisted on that; and from the very beginning, while I was outlining our delegation's position at the talks, I also talked about the political criteria. We have simply come to a point where political criteria cannot be separated from other criteria. Whether one likes it or not, we talked about political criteria. As I have already said—and this can never be over-emphasized—the process of negotiation must be conducted within the framework of the reintegration of occupied areas.

[Announcer] Today you agreed on some new meetings—in Zagreb in a week's time—and work in commissions.

[Sarinic] Yes, you are right. On 15 November we shall again meet in Zagreb, and prior to that, expert commissions will work on certain complex issues. I would like to say the following: We can no longer accept the procrastination that has taken place. In this regard, the Croatian delegation had a very resolute and firm stance. We have given them a final deadline by which an agreement has to be signed: 21 November. We have also given them a one-month deadline for implementing that agreement and whatever it is technically possible to implement by that deadline. As regards whatever it is not possible to implement, the process of implementing it should begin by that deadline.

I must tell you: It is very important that, we insisted that, the agenda for the next meeting should include the return

of refugees, because, as I have said on several occasions so far: Such meetings should not serve their own purpose. We must move toward the normalization of relations, which means that refugees must return. We insisted on it, although our interlocutors did not follow us on that path. Nevertheless, we insisted on it, and we shall continue to insist on it.

[Announcer] Thank you very much.

[Sarinic] Thank you.

Owen, Babic, Mikelic Comment on Knin Talks

AU0311213394 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 3 Nov 94

[Ivica Milosavljevic video report on statements made in Knin on 3 November by David Owen, co-chairman of the international peace conference on the former Yugoslavia; RSK Foreign Minister Milan Babić; and RSK Prime Minister Borislav Mikelić—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Milosavljevic] After talks that lasted six hours [between representatives of Croatia and the republic of Serbian Krajina, RSK], the co-chairmen of the peace conference were the first to address journalists:

[David Owen, in English with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian] The time is very short, as you know; we have to go back. We have made progress. This is another constructive meeting. There are still some big problems that should be solved. We have agreed to hold three meetings. The first, to be held in Split on Monday [7 November], is to be a meeting of experts dealing with electricity.

This is also a part of the meeting.

Mr. Sarinic. [as heard]

So, there will be three meetings. The first meeting will be in Split on Monday, a meeting of experts dealing with electricity. This is one of the basic problems; therefore, one should develop the package concerning electricity.

Can we turn the engine off? O.K.

So, this is the first meeting. The second meeting will take place in Erdut next Friday [11 November] and be a meeting of legal and commercial experts regarding the matter of oil. On Tuesday, there will be a full meeting chaired by Mr. Stoltenberg and myself on the Zagreb Pleso Airport. All meetings will be held at UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] headquarters.

So, those are the three meetings scheduled. (?The next meeting will be on Tuesday, 16 November [as heard], and if need be will go on until evening. We shall have a helicopter at our disposal and if the meeting is long, we shall take Mr. Mikelić and his delegation to Belgrade. Thus, we shall be able to work longer.

We are preparing ourselves for an agreement, but nobody can promise an agreement, because some difficult questions remain.

[Milan Babić] We have come the closest on the issue of water supplies. One could perhaps say that on this point we have coordinated views. However, on all other issues, we stand at diametrically opposed. Thank you.

[Unidentified reporter] Was there any politization?

[Mikelić] There was politization by Sarinic [head of the Croatian office for national security], but I think we managed to stop him. By the way, he does that every time. That was his habit in Zagreb as well, and he tried it again today, at the very beginning of our talks; and we thereby certainly lost almost one hour on that. He tried to impose an approach to the effect that these are occupied areas and that this is reintegration. Of course we did not accept such an approach by Mr. Sarinic. We completely rejected it. We had a break. We even demanded (?time-out).

[Unidentified reporter] How did the peace mediators react?

[Mikelić] Well, I think that they accepted our stand that questions such as the ones that Sarinic came out with cannot be put in the context of our talks and (?provocations), particularly those on economic issues. I must say that this was a thorough, difficult, and—I would say—complex talk, because we are, of course, defending our interests, which are above all connected with the republic of Serbian Krajina; and we shall not sign a single agreement, nor shall we go any farther, in the sense of a doing something that would be against our people's interest and that would in any way put us in a subordinate position on the economic plane.

Yugoslav, Croatia Foreign Ministers Begin Talks

LD0411104394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0951 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb, 4 Nov (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic and Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic began their talks in Zagreb this morning.

This meeting, expected to be the first in a series of meetings being held alternatively in Zagreb and Belgrade, is also being attended by the co-chairmen of the conference on the former Yugoslavia, Owen and Stoltenberg.

It is likely that, following these talks—which should mark the beginning of the process of normalization between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia, Jovanovic and Granic will make statements only to news agencies and TV studios from the two countries.

Vladislav Jovanovic arrived in Zagreb this morning.

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Defense Ministry Denies Army Fighting in Kupres

LD0311172994 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Josip Rajcic, head of the information department of the political administration of the Croatian Defense Ministry, told HINA today that not a single member of the Croatian Army took part in fighting on the Kupres battlefield. He stressed that our country could not interfere in the affairs of another country—adding that allegations made by Belgrade that Croatian Army units had fought alongside the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Croatian Defense Council in the Kupres area are untrue and represent an abuse of information.

Tudjman Meets With Russian Envoy Zotov

LD0311232894 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2140 GMT 3 Nov 94

[From the "Picture vs Picture" program]

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has received, at the presidential palace, Ambassador Aleksandr Zotov, Russian President Yeltsin's special envoy and a member of the Contact Group. Tudjman pointed to Russia's constructive approach in the resolution of the crisis, stressing his appreciation for Russian recognition of Croatia's sovereignty and territorial integrity and for the efforts Russia has made to have the problem of the Serb minority be resolved within Croatia.

President Tudjman stressed that after three years of negotiations, Croatia will no longer tolerate procrastination, nor extend the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] mandate unless the implementation of the UN Security Council resolution on the reintegration of occupied areas begins, the deadline being 20 December 1994. Here is what the Russian envoy said:

[Begin recording] [Zotov, in Russian with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian] I had a very useful conversation with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. I think that I have managed to call attention to certain details regarding the resolution of the situation and hear what Zagreb's views were.

I tried to present Russia's position. Fruitful contact was established. It remains for us to hope that the situation in the former Yugoslavia will not bring any unexpected, unpleasant surprises. I hope there will be no escalation of violence, because under the present circumstances no effort to resolve the conflict will be spared difficulties. I have managed to continue with the constructive talks that I had begun in Belgrade.

[Unidentified correspondent, in Russian with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian] What are your

impressions from your first visit to the former Yugoslavia, and how do you view the prospects for resolving the conflict?

[Zotov] I do not just wish to believe in the prospects for a peaceful solution, but I will also assist in that, through diplomatic services and relevant offices; but much depends on the policy pursued by the parties. We have to create conditions for a speedier resolution of the conflict. [end recording]

Evictions, Breakdown in Rule of Law Discussed

LD0311221294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1826 GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Nov. 3 (TANJUG)—Chairman of the Croatian branch of the Helsinki Human Rights Committee Ivan Zvonimir Cicak said Thursday that about 10,000 people had been evicted from flats in Croatia.

In a two-day debate on evictions, Cicak said the first wave of evictions during the 1991 war "were nothing but crimes, very often committed by persons wearing Croatian Army and police uniforms."

The debate was organized by the international Helsinki federation and the New York-based institute "Open Society." Croatian authorities are evicting non-Croats, mainly Serb families, from flats owned by the former Yugoslav People's Army.

Cicak said in the second wave of evictions there were cases which "not only reflected the collapse of the legal state, but also of public and private morals," saying "evictions were Croatia's plague."

Opposing Cicak's statement, Croatia's Public Prosecutor Petar Sale said evictions were carried out in line with legal proceedings.

Chairman of the Zagreb Human Rights Committee Zoran Pusic reacted to this by saying evictions were "nothing but criminal actions" in which armed people were breaking into other peoples' homes.

Therefore, "legal proceedings," as Sale referred to them, could only be related to Wild West law, Pusic said.

Vice-Chairman of the Croatian branch of the Helsinki Human Rights Committee Slobodan Budak said Croatian state structures wanted to legally simplify the issue of evictions and reduce their importance.

Budak said this was an instance of "inequality of Croatian citizens before the law." He said that in Croatia some people were discriminated and others were privileged.

Participants in the debate also said the evicted people were politically stigmatized and disqualified, being designated as enemies.

Course of 'Poseidon 94' Exercise Viewed

AU0311133194 Zagreb HRVATSKI VOJNIK in
Serbo-Croatian 21 Oct 94 pp 8-13

[Gordan Lausic article: "'Poseidon 94'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the presence of Prime Minister Nikica Valentice, Defense Minister Gojko Susak, Chief of Staff of the Croatian Army, General Janko Bobetko, military attaches accredited in the Republic of Croatia, and other high civilian and military officials of the Republic of Croatia, only part of the power of the Croatian Army was displayed in the extremely accurate shooting of the anti-ship RBS-15 missiles launched from the Croatian Navy gunboats 11, Kralj Petar Kresimir IV and 21, Sibenik, and the efficient air force attacks in the 'Poseidon 94' tactical exercise on Wednesday, 12 October.

On the basis of the annual order for the training of the commands and troops of the Croatian Army, as well as the demands of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Croatia for the testing of new combat equipment used by the Croatian Navy and the Croatian Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defense, Chief of Staff Bobetko issued the order to carry out exercise 'Poseidon 94.' The exercise was prepared and performed within a very short time as clear evidence of the readiness of all corps of the Croatian Army that would, at the order of President Tudjman, start working toward the final liberation of all the temporarily occupied territories. In his address immediately before the beginning of the first part of the exercise, General Bobetko pointed out that 'Poseidon 94' would, through everything that was displayed there, contribute to the further improvement of the Croatian Army in fighting any attempt to endanger the Croatian state on land, at sea, and in the air; referring to the special aims of the exercise, primarily the test of the complex anti-ship system based on the RBS-15 missile. Remarking that the former Yugoslav Army had never used this missile system precisely because the personnel was not trained for it, and because certain parts of the equipment were not available, General Bobetko said that the combat readiness of this missile system was entirely the work of Croatian experts.

The main task of the Croatian Air Force was to test the efficiency of the new ammunition in the Croatian Army arsenal, and the skill of the flight and land personnel for attacks on a larger scale than before, with much more complex tasks. "The experience gained will provide the basis for further improvements in the Croatian Army. All the elements of the operational and combat power of the Croatian Army have increased significantly. The Croatian Army did not have such potential until now.... 'Poseidon 94' represents a further improvement of all the elements of the Croatian Army in accordance with the demands and positions of the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, that if other means for the integration of the occupied areas are fruitless, the Croatian Army be prepared to carry out the

task in an efficient way and with as few losses as possible." Thus ending his introductory speech, General Bobetko ordered commander of the Croatian Navy, Admiral Sveto Letica, and commander of the Croatian Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defense, Major General Imra Agotic, to start the exercise.

Gun-boats Kralj Petar Kresimir IV and Sibenik had already sailed, arrived at the launching site, carried out the radar surveillance and observation of the given targets, and completed the preparation of the missile complex for launching. The countdown was heard on the speakers placed round the main grandstand, and Kresimir, under the command of Lieutenant Tonci Vidan, launched a missile at the former torpedo boat 219. The first missile attack on the target "boat" was completed. Far on the horizon a flare and thick smoke could be observed. The missile was launched. It took the missile 105 seconds from the moment of launch to reach the target, 16.5 miles from Kresimir. There was a direct hit, a flare, then a boom, and the ship turned into a pile of steel, cut in half, over which there was a high column of smoke. One hundred-percent accuracy.

The loud applause of all those present, and congratulations to Admiral Letica and all the sailors, were interrupted by the voice of the announcer, Commander Ivan Supic, who announced the second missile attack, this time of Sibenik, under the command of Lieutenant Predrag Stipanovic, on the decommissioned landing tank carrier. Another 105-second countdown started. Five more, four, three, two, one... hit. The cries "Both of them, both of them" reminded us of the days in 1991 when Croatia was defended with the heart, and today, along with the heart, we also have a hand that is long enough, and strengthened by the state-of-the-art weapons.

The range of the RBS-15 missile is over 80 km, it flies at low altitude, and thus evades detection by the enemy anti-missile defense.

Moreover, the RBS-15 missile, produced by the Bofors/Saab-Scania company of Sweden, can program the flight profile, so it is possible to launch attacks on a target that is behind a certain radar shadow. The system for guiding the RBS-15 missile consists of a radar at the very top of the missile, which operates in the X-frequency area, and has the option of changing it constantly in order to make disturbance additionally difficult. At the moment when the disturbance does become too strong, the electronics of the guiding system switches off the active mode and switches to the passive, and guides the missile toward the source of the disturbance signal.

The flight profile of the RBS-15 consists of three stages, with seven sub-stages altogether. The first stage is the launching stage, the second the cruising stage, part of which is at programmed altitude, after which the detector switches on, and the target is found. In the third, final stage, the missile switches to sweeping flight, gets down to the altitude of attack (two to four meters), and

then follows the warhead hit with 85 kg of highly destructive explosive charge.

After more than excellent hits "in the center," Kralj Petar Kresimir IV and Sibenik quickly started toward the targets for the next part of the first component of the exercise in order to carry out an artillery attack. Shortly after the direct hits of the RBS, while the ships were still under a screen of smoke, Croatian Air Force planes started carrying out their first task. Suddenly, invisible till the last moment, two MiG-21bis planes swooped down on the targets, dropping on them air-to-land unguided missiles. The first target hit by the new missiles started sinking rapidly. Sibenik and Kresimir had already arrived at a distance of eight km, and, according to orders, used 57-mm caliber prow guns to destroy what would in a real situation be a crew busy trying to save the ship and their lives. Several salvos, and everything was finished.

With the help of transport helicopters MI-8 MTV, the second part followed. It was a real pleasure to watch the pilots landing with exceptional skill on an area no larger than several square meters. After a pleasant flight above the gun-boats, in 10 minutes we were above the other end of the Island of Dugi Otok. There followed a display of the activities of the aircraft on land targets. With the expert commentary of brigadier Ovcaricek, the other part of 'Poseidon 94' began.

Flying quietly above the sea's surface from the direction of the sun, we saw MI-24V Hind combat helicopters dive out from the point where the sea and the sky joined, using the radio-guided missiles for destruction of armored facilities at a distance of between 1 and 5 km. The tank line on the little island in front of the grandstand was not even aware of what had happened. The direct hits left next to nothing of the targets. This was only the beginning. There followed the action of two MiG-21bis on the anti-aircraft positions, using the unguided missiles. While the sound of the explosions had not even died away, there followed a run of another two MiG-21bis planes, which also aimed at the anti-aircraft targets of the simulated aircraft base. The shells were fired from the two-barrel gun for shooting at air and land targets, installed under the fuselage. Success was complete. The Anti-Aircraft Defense and the air base defense system no longer existed. The way was open for new air force runs.

Immediately following this, first one MiG-21bis and then two more, used a special bomb for the destruction of armored-concrete structures on the runway and the armored-concrete aircraft shelters. The bomb makes a 9 by 12-meter crater, four meters deep, and puts the runway out of use for a long period of time until it is repaired. The plan for destroying the aircraft base also anticipates the elimination of the repair crew, so immediately after they started carrying out their task, another MiG-21 made another attack with two high-explosive bombs.

Naturally, we must not forget that in a real combat situation the attack would be carried out by several times more planes carrying more bombs, and everything would be over much more quickly.

At the end of the display of air force activities, the MiG's acted on the site of the helicopter assault and the planes at the apron with four bombs; the two used on the helicopter assault were high-explosive bombs, and two were incendiary bombs. The Croatian Air Force also displayed the use of the MI-8 MTV helicopters with the anti-fire pail Pelican (Croatian-produced), and everything the MI-8 MTV helicopter can do to save people from the sea—in this case, the saving of the pilot who jumped off the plane that was hit.

Congratulating the members of the Croatian Air Force on the successfully completing the second part of the exercise 'Poseidon 94,' general Janko Bobetko invited those present to attend the parade of the Air Force and the Navy, held in Bozava at the Island of Dugi Otok. Apart from the gun-boats Kralj Petar Kresimir IV and Sibenik, four groups of three MiG-21bis, three MI-24V, and three MI-8 MTV helicopters flew in the parade. The perfect alignment of the 12 MiG's was particularly impressive.

In his address at the final stage of the ceremony, Defense Minister Gojko Susak congratulated the participants in the exercise on the successful performance of all the tasks, and Prime Minister Valentic remarked that 'Poseidon 94' provided clear evidence that the Croatian Army has been growing into a modern army that will very soon be one of the best armies in Europe. "In case the overall diplomatic activities yield no results, it is clear that Croatia has the right to resolve the problem of the occupied territories with all available means," said Valentic, congratulating the Croatian Air Force and the Croatian Navy, as well as all the members of the Croatian Army who participated, on the exceptionally successful exercise.

FRG's Latest Show of Support for Croatia Viewed
AU0411123194 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in
Serbo-Croatian 28 Oct 94 p 2

[Report by VJESNIK's Bonn correspondent Nenad Ivankovic on meeting of foreign ministers of Croatia and Germany, Mate Granic and Klaus Kinkel: "Croatia Can Rely on Germany"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Croatia can still rely on Germany," both with regard to solving the problem of its occupied areas and with regard to its inclusion into European integration processes.

This is what head of German diplomacy, Kinkel, said on Thursday after a meeting with Croatian Foreign Minister Mato Granic in Bonn.

Kinkel pointed out that the new peace plan for Croatia and involving Croatia into the PHARE [Economic

Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program was the main topic of the meeting. Granic gave Kinkel a letter from Croatian President Tudjman for Chancellor Kohl, which explains the current situation in Croatian occupied areas as well as Croatian proposals for the solution to this vital question.

Head of Bonn diplomacy, who said that Granic's visit was yet another sign of "close friendly relations and partnership" between the two countries, expressed hope that the new peace plan for Croatia—which is "still at an early stage"—"will lay good foundations for a peaceful solution." He added that the plan ties in with "key elements of the Vance plan." Furthermore, Kinkel said that, when the plan is presented to the "conflicting parties," Croatia "must be given a chance to say what it thinks about it." The head of the Bonn diplomacy, obviously alluding to Germany's supporting Croatia regarding the problem, emphasized that the German representative in the Zagreb contact group (Z-4), Ambassador Ahrens, plays "an absolutely crucial role."

With regard to that, Granic told the press that Croatia would not make concessions regarding territorial integrity and sovereignty, but that, on the other hand, Zagreb was prepared to "give a high degree of autonomy to the Knin Serbs for districts of Knin and Glina, i.e. for 11 municipalities in which the Serbs had been in the majority before the war."

After the meeting with his Zagreb counterpart, Kinkel informed the press that the EU commission that visited Zagreb on his own initiative to prepare the groundwork for including Croatia into the PHARE program, returned with positive results. Kinkel added that this will be formally presented at the EU ministerial session in Luxembourg on Monday, paving the way for Croatia to become a member of this important program. PHARE membership is "the first important step toward a cooperation agreement between Croatia and the EU," said Kinkel.

Particularly important for Germany is the fact that the agreement on German war memorials in Croatia has been prepared and that it will soon be signed.

Kinkel and Granic expressed hope that the Bosnian Serbs would nevertheless ultimately accept the peace

plan for Bosnia and appealed to Milosevic to recognize Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in their internationally-recognized borders. Kinkel emphasized that Milosevic should be particularly careful not to violate the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia. Both ministers appealed to the Serbian president to keep the border with the Bosnian Serbs closed and to deny any help in weapons and oil to Karadzic and his insane military leadership.

With regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Granic emphasized that Croatia was acting in compliance with the Washington Agreement and that it fully supported the peace plan of the contact group in charge of that country.

Minister Granic returned to Zagreb last night.

[Box, p 2]

First the Croatian Army on All Croatian Borders

In his statement made exclusively for VJESNIK and VECERNJI LIST, Croatian foreign minister said that according to the new peace plan—which he thought could be officially presented in about 10 days—western and eastern Slavonia would, relatively soon, come under full control of the Republic of Croatia, which means that for a short transition period, until the refugees return to their homes, those areas would be controlled by the international community. Granic added that the Croatian Army would nevertheless be deployed along all borders of Croatia!

Regarding autonomy for the districts of Knin and Glina, they would not have the status of "a state within a state," but would enjoy a broad autonomy "in the spirit of the Constitutional Law on Minorities and of President Tudjman's peace initiative." Granic said that Croatia insisted that pink zones be excluded from the autonomous area, i.e. that it include only the 11 municipalities that had the Serb majority before the war. Autonomy must be "compatible with the European models of autonomy," emphasized Granic. Furthermore, Granic said that the new peace plan will not be a "take it or leave it" variant, but that Croatia will be given a chance to review it. "It is crucial that Germany act against every pressure on Croatia designed to make it accept the plan under unacceptable terms for Croatia," said Granic.

Gligorov Interviewed About Responsibilities

AU0311221094 Skopje MIC in English 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In his first interview, immediately following the elections for president of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], for the news magazine MACEDONIAN TIMES, which is also published in English, and which will be on sale today, Gligorov emphasized that "the Macedonian nation has understood that this policy should be continued, with the policy of peace, coexistence, policy of international affirmation of Macedonia and for the European option."

In the interview, Gligorov underlined that "this bonds us to orient ourselves even more determinedly, firstly for a gradual integration into the European association; secondly to work even more determinedly on the resolution of the problems with our neighbors and to create an atmosphere of security around us and open doors for cooperation with the neighbors. Then, it is very important to continue in the country with the strengthening of the mutual understanding with the national minorities, gradually creating a basis for a civil state in which, foremost, the citizen will decide about Macedonia's fate; and finally, in view of the fact that the war is coming to an end, and the embargo, I am confident that we have to be prepared to embark on the path of serious political and economic reforms in the country." On this note, President Gligorov stressed the readiness of the international community to help Macedonia economically, which should be used to bring such laws that will enable the influx of foreign capital and to speed up the privatization process.

Speaking of his personal experiences, following his election as first President of the Republic of Macedonia with a ballot of the voters, at the first general presidential elections in the country, President Gligorov emphasized that it is a great honor, but also a greater responsibility. "Because, responsibility before parliament is one thing, like some sort of indirect responsibility before the people, and responsibility when a great majority of the people come out in favor of my candidacy, is another thing, which sets even greater obligations for me. On the other hand, that type of relation that I've tried to promote once or twice, and that is: to be seen as president of all citizens of Macedonia regardless of party, national or religious affiliation, has to be confirmed now," President Gligorov concluded.

Tirana TV: 19 Albanians Win in Elections

AU0311133094 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 31 Oct 94

[Report by Ibadete Hajrullahu from Skopje]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] It is known that 19 candidates from Albanian political forces have won parliamentary elections in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia so far. The results of the second round of the elections are still not complete.

[Hajrullahu] Reports, not yet complete, confirm that 73 candidates from the Alliance for Macedonia, nine from the Party for Democratic Prosperity, three from the Popular Democratic Party, and seven Albanian independent candidates won posts as deputy in the future assembly of Macedonia.

The central election commission is expected to announce the final results of the multiparty election in Macedonia today. It is also reported that elections are to be repeated at several polling stations.

Regarding the Albanian independent candidates, it is now clear that they scored a great success. We say so because they entered the electoral race under very unfavorable conditions, with tension and attempts to remove them from the Macedonian political scene. Arber Xhaferri and Mendu Thaci had convincing victories, as well as others who have yet to be announced. This party received its legitimacy from the people, not from the Macedonian authorities.

So-called technical and organizational problems were manifested even in the second round and, as is known, more so in Albanian circles, despite the international commitment to eliminate these problems. The majority of citizens were bewildered, not knowing where to vote, as polling stations were moved from one place to another. Election councils were altered with the aim of causing Albanian independent candidates to fail.

The 1994 Macedonia elections were observed by more than 700 international observers from the United Nations, the CSCE, the Council of Europe, and UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces].

At a news conference held today, they assessed the elections as being a step toward democracy, but they did not analyze it through to the end. Definitive conclusions will be given by the General Assembly of Europe at its 5 January meeting next year. We must add that their remarks addressed old electoral laws and granting nationality to all Macedonian citizens. [as heard]

Drnovsek: Treaty Rejection in Country's Interest*AU0311155694 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2100 GMT 2 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek was a guest in today's Studio at 1700 program.

Regarding the talks with Italy, he said that Minister Peterle went to Aquileia with the government's authority, however, without any specific platform for the talks. Drnovsek believes that the Aquileia document, had it been passed, would have exceeded the framework of the Osimo and Rome agreements. Before the meeting in Aquileia, the government had notified the EU members of its readiness to change the Constitution in accordance with the European norms.

The prime minister rebuffed some assessments that the entire affair reflected an internal political conflict. I can assure you, he emphasized, that the rejection of the Aquileia document is exclusively in Slovenia's interests.

Regarding the negotiations in Rome, Prime Minister Drnovsek stated that minimal progress was made at them in comparison to the talks in Aquileia.

Regarding the Italian criticism that Slovenia behaved irresponsibly, Drnovsek said that the Italian foreign minister was only quoting Peterle's statements. It is a peculiar precedent, in Drnovsek's opinion, that a foreign minister acts against his own government in negotiations. Such behavior by Former Foreign Minister Peterle surprised me, Drnovsek said, among other things.

Drnovsek, Peterle 'Regret' EU Postponement*AU0111172694 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 1 Nov 94*

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovenia will have to wait until the end of this month for the beginning of negotiations on its associate membership in the European Union [EU]. According to Klaus Kinkel, chairman of the EU Ministerial Council, negotiations with our country are only then to be discussed again.

Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek expressed regret at the decision made by the Italian Government and deemed it as not befitting European democracy and rather as a form of pressure on the part of a bigger state against a smaller one. He pointed to the Slovene Government's readiness to solve the dispute with Italy through diplomatic means.

Former Foreign Minister Lojze Peterle expressed regret that the irresponsible behavior in Luxembourg yesterday made it impossible for Slovenia to come closer to the EU. He pointed out that everything is prepared at the Foreign Ministry for tomorrow's transfer.

Lojze Peterle is also planning tomorrow to propose to the Christian Democrats' Executive Committee to step out of the government coalition, because, according to him, the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia again showed itself to

be an incorrect partner, both regarding proposals for a new foreign minister and efforts to settle relations with Italy.

Intelligence Service Chief Views Role, Tasks*AU0311172294 Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 22 Oct 94 pp 16-18*

[Interview with Drago Fers, acting chief of the Slovene Intelligence-Security Agency, by Toni Peric on 21 October; place not given: "SOVA's Wings Have Not Been Clipped"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *Drago Fers, acting director of the Slovene Intelligence-Security Agency [SOVA] has finally agreed to give his first interview. There have been plenty of opportunities for it; however, he only agreed to give an interview for DNEVNIK's Saturday supplement last week. The first question arose by itself. Why?*

[Fers] I have already talked to reporters, however, always about specific matters and always briefly. I do not favor an intelligence agency chief appearing frequently in the media. However, I believe that the situation in the country, especially the events that are accompanying the passing of our law, is sufficiently topical to define certain terms expertly and contribute toward clarification of certain viewpoints, that is, assist in this process. [passage omitted]

Not a Classic Acting Chief

[Peric] To take the Law on Security-Intelligence Activity as the point of departure, although we, of course, have numerous other questions in store, we are interested in your opinion as to where and why things got complicated and what fate do you expect for the law?

[Fers] The law will be once again discussed by the [parliamentary] commission for supervision of work of intelligence services (the interview took place two days before the session of the above commission—author's note). We have compiled an extensive interpretation of the law's text in which we tried to answer the open questions raised by members of parliament.

[Peric] The explanation is slightly over 20 pages long?

[Fers] Our contribution thoroughly defines the basic guidelines, meaning, and expert views that are all supposed to assist the passing of the law.

[Peric] The text will be distributed among reporters, too, therefore, there will be plenty of talk about it later. At the moment it would be interesting to hear how you view the fact that while you are probably in a post of great state importance you have been "acting chief" for a year?

[Fers] The appointment of SOVA's chief is the responsibility of the prime minister and the government. However, I would like to emphasize immediately that performance of these duties is not a classical acting position at the moment. Last July I was appointed

deputy chief of SOVA and following the departure of Mr. Jakin in October, being the deputy chief, I assumed the role of chief with full authority and full responsibility. This, therefore, does not mean standing in for a certain post but performance of duties.

It is worth pointing out that resolution of this matter should be viewed from another standpoint. Namely, we must keep in mind the build-up of the security-intelligence system in the country. Because we have not reached a consensus about the organization of this system yet, I also advocate a view that we should first create the security-intelligence system, find a consensus, and then search for the most suitable cadre solutions.

[Peric] Beside this temporary status, a parallel for which cannot be found in any other similar service abroad, you will also go down in history as the man who took the helm when the service was literally decimated. How is the consolidation of the service, to which experts and objective observers predicted anything but success, proceeding?

SOVA "Flying" Again

[Fers] More than 200 operational agents and administrative workers have left the service and it is true that the service was not exactly stout and powerful. The truth is that we have subsequently reactivated some of our retired agents. However, I would like to emphasize that during this time we have employed numerous new agents, mostly young, and that the retired workers who were reactivated assumed the responsibility of mentors and to a great extent trained the younger ones for independent work.

Naturally, we do not delude ourselves that we could train an operational cadre within a short period of time. However, thanks to great efforts by everybody it can be concluded that we have achieved certain progress. We stopped the decrease and temporary drop in intelligence and security information relatively quickly; that is, at the beginning of the year we increased the quantity of this information to an adequate level.

[Peric] How does a service like this measure its success or output? You probably cannot speak in numbers of investigated criminal acts?

[Fers] I personally find it very difficult to judge the agency's efficiency, which is easier done by the recipients of our information, that is, those for whom our "product" is intended. I dare say that with its latest organizational enhancements, SOVA has been showing vigorous growth in the operational and logistic sphere. Our conclusion is that if no extraordinary activities unexpectedly occur in the country in the sphere of protection of the constitutional order then the service is fulfilling its mission.

[Peric] However, the events concerning Italy and especially Croatia demonstrate that the foreign affairs' department is not well informed, that is, an ordinary

person would with difficulty find another explanation for some unnecessary complications. How do the relations with our neighboring countries reflect on your service?

[Fers] For example, we predicted the events connected to the straining of relations with Italy long before the passing of the Italian law which creates possibility for acquisition of dual citizenship. We foresaw certain segments in the relations with Croatia after Slovenia's gaining of independence as open issues were emerging at that time already.

To me it seems extremely important for the constitution of the service that the government last summer confirmed the new directives which allowed the service to concentrate on those affairs that nowadays actually constitute priority in our work.

[Peric] What about, for example, the proximity of Bosnia and other crisis regions of the former Yugoslavia? It is being rumored that clashes are spreading on Slovene territory, too, naturally in a different form.

[Fers] The superseded and deficient legislation allowed these people even to form political parties in Slovenia with official views that echoed the policy of their mother parties, which often did not espouse friendly sympathies toward Slovenia.

On the other hand we observe all the time that this population is assembling, which is, of course, positive when it is aimed at preservation of cultural identity. However, one should view differently assembling for different aims, that is, to act in an undemocratic fashion. I am referring to attempts to instigate national hatred, action of one side against another, and, ultimately, attempts to stop other groups from promoting their views. I am primarily speaking of physical clashes which are already occurring among individual groups. [passage omitted]

[Peric] Your service, for example, does not write criminal denunciations; therefore, it must rely on the Interior Ministry in cases of criminal activity. How much of this cooperation is there and how do you assess it?

[Fers] The fundamental problem is precisely the absence of legislation. We believe and judge that if we had clear legislation these relations would become legally defined. In the process of transition from one system to another and in search of a general role of all services that work in the defense-security sphere—SOVA, the security service of the Defense Ministry, and relevant services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs—the relations are not legally clearly limited. In the absence of clear legal limitations, it can occur, I emphasize, it can occur that certain things overlap, that certain signals are not acted upon, and—what naturally also happens—that there is competitiveness among the services.

[Peric] Beside SOVA's law, as it has been labelled, a Law on Public Safety is also currently being drafted which in at least two paragraphs encroach on your territory.

[Fers] That is true. However, we must compare this with the provisions of Articles 2, 4, 5, and 7 of the Law on Security-Intelligence Activity. Our law in Article 2 stipulates that authorized state offices and services uncover, prevent, and investigate criminal activities and endeavors that threaten the state security. A provision with this meaning is contained in the proposals of both laws, however, in each of them slightly differently. Just as the Law on Public Security defines the activity of the police, speaking of uncovering and prevention, the Law on Security-Intelligence Activity states that we perform these duties by collection, documentation, and analysis.

It further contains limitations, as SOVA performs activities in the so-called phase of preparatory events in which a criminal act has not been perpetrated yet but the situation nevertheless involves preparations that could threaten the state interests. Once a grounded suspicion exists that activities that are punishable by law are occurring everything is passed over to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The difference is also that SOVA gathers data that threaten the interests of Slovenia, while threatening these interests is not necessarily a criminal act and, therefore, does not fall within the responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Ministry of Internal Affairs operates on the territory of our state and only holds authority on this territory, while SOVA also operates outside our borders and, of course, seeks connections between the outside world and the events in the country.

Of course, I must emphasize that SOVA does not hold executive powers nor police authorities and, thus, cannot act. Its duty is to gather, document, and inform those with executive powers.

I feel that I should speak of the so-called fear of concentration of power here. Bearing in mind the division I have just outlined, we can wonder what is more dangerous: To have a security service in the same department as other services that hold the majority of records about a man's personal circumstances, to exclude it from this department and only give it limited powers, or to keep it within the department which has executive powers as well as all other records?

In the Law on Security-Intelligence Activity we decided to exclude this activity and prevent "totalitarianism" in this sphere, which has been so characteristic of the previous times. [passage omitted]

No More Bugging

[Peric] Finally, we cannot bypass some questions that one simply must ask the director of such a service. Are you bugging anyone and how many such cases do you have? Are you bugging anyone without the required permissions?

[Fers] In expert terminology, bugging means monitoring, that is listing to everything that happens in a certain installation. SOVA does not have such powers. No service in our state—neither security nor intelligence—has the authority to bug. The law and the constitution only stipulate that following a set procedure an incumbent security service can monitor communication links between citizens. [passage omitted]

Federal

Agreement With Red Cross on Aid Deliveries

LD0411123094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1128 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 4 Nov (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav authorities, representatives of the mission of the international conference on the former Yugoslavia, and representatives of international humanitarian organizations have signed an agreement on the unhindered delivery of aid across the Drina River, head of ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] mission Francois Bellon told TANJUG today.

"To the satisfaction of all sides, particularly to the satisfaction of the victims, we have solved, together with the Yugoslav authorities and General Pellnas' mission, the technical problems in delivering humanitarian aid which we have been encountering since the blockade of the Drina went into effect", Bellon said.

"We have agreed with director of the Federal Customs Administration Mihalj Kertes to use all crossings on the Drina. I am very optimistic as regards further cooperation with the Yugoslav authorities", Bellon stressed.

He stresses that this agreement has been reached just in time, thus enabling the ICRC to be the first to provide humanitarian aid in the current situation in western Bosnia, where nearly 13,000 people have fled Kupres, Bihac, Bosanski Petrovac, Jasenica, Sanski Most, and so on.

According to the agreement reached, in addition to food, clothes, and medicine, from now on the ICRC will also be able to deliver water purification equipment, toiletry items, blankets, and so on to the population of these areas as well as fuel for ICRC official vehicles, radio equipment, and office furniture.

Government Issues Statement on Talks With Croatia

LD0311153594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1342 GMT 3 Nov 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Oct 3 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Government on Thursday said Yugoslavia's direct dialogue with Croatia should help strengthen the process of the normalization of the mutual relations.

The official statement said the government on Thursday adopted the platform for Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic's talks with his Croatian counterpart, Mate Granic, in the Croatian capital of Zagreb on Friday.

The statement quoted the government as saying Yugoslavia had once again shown the readiness to resolve all issues which had emerged since the beginning of

Croatia's secession from the former Yugoslavia to the present day through talks and other political means.

After Croatia forcibly seceded from the former Yugoslavia in 1991, all ties between Belgrade and Zagreb were broken off.

Minister Granic has said that Croatia is ready to normalize relations with Yugoslavia but on a number of conditions.

Yugoslavia, for its part, wants to normalize relations with Croatia but is opposed to conditions being set.

Platform for Jovanovic-Granic Talks Adopted

LD0311184894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1203 GMT 3 Nov 93

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 3 Nov (TANJUG)—At a session today, chaired by Prime Minister Radoje Kontic, the federal government adopted a platform for talks between Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic and Mate Granic, Croatian deputy premier and foreign minister, in Zagreb, the Federal Information Secretariat has reported. [passage omitted]

In accordance with the reorganization of the federal government, ministries and other federal bodies and organizations, the federal government today adopted a decision on establishing a Yugoslav commission for cooperation with UNICEF.

The government appointed Ljubisa Popovic, hitherto assistant general secretary of the government, deputy general secretary. Branko Rakic, former deputy federal minister for human rights and rights of minorities, was appointed secretary of the Federal Justice Ministry. Zoran Stojanovic, professor at the Novi Sad Faculty of Law and former federal minister of justice, was appointed chairman of the commission for gathering data on crimes against humanity and international law, the Information Secretariat reported at the end of its statement.

Parliament Adopts Free-Trade Zone Bill

LD0311141894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1242 GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Nov. 3 (TANJUG)—The lower chamber of the Yugoslav parliament has adopted a bill on free-trade zones to create a framework for foreign investments in the Yugoslav economy.

Under the act, free-trade zones will be founded and organized by public enterprises and their imports and exports will be unlimited, as transit through Yugoslavia.

The founding of a free-trade zone has to be approved by the federal government before public enterprises go ahead with their organization. A public enterprise could be founded by domestic and foreign natural or juristic

persons, including social and political organizations. Purchases by Yugoslav customers in the zone are treated as Yugoslav export and the sale of Yugoslav products as import.

All export-import transactions are subject to the usual foreign trade regulations.

TANJUG To Operate as Public Enterprise

LD0311222194 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1811 GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 3 Nov (TANJUG)—The TANJUG news agency will in future function as a publicly owned enterprise.

This is the gist of the law on the publicly owned TANJUG news agency enterprise, adopted today by the Federal Assembly's Chamber of Citizens. The law, adopted earlier on by the Chamber of the Republics, specifies that TANJUG is funded by the state.

The presidents and members of the executive council and supervisory committee, as well as TANJUG's director, are appointed and dismissed by the federal government. TANJUG is run by an executive council, which adopts editorial policies at the director's proposal.

The decisions of the executive council are carried out by the director, who is also charged with organizing and managing TANJUG's affairs. The TANJUG director's term in office is five years, with the possibility of reelection.

The agency's editor in chief is appointed and dismissed by the executive council, at the director's proposal. The legislation envisages a council of experts, appointed by the executive council.

TANJUG is to submit a report on its work, as well as an annual balance sheet, to the federal government at least once a year. [passage omitted]

Kosovo

Owen, Stoltenberg Appraise Rugova's Policy

AU0311194994 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 2 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] In Geneva, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Republic of Kosova, today met Lord Owen and Thornwald Stoltenberg, the cochairmen of the international conference on former Yugoslavia.

The meeting was held at the invitation of both co-chairmen and focused on the Kosova issue and the possibility of peacefully resolving it. Talks concentrated on the current situation in Kosova and the developments in the region, as well the possibility of initiating a dialogue to resolve the Kosova issue.

Republic of Kosova President Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, who was accompanied by Prime Minister Bukoshi, briefed

the co-chairmen of the Geneva conference on the current situation in Kosova, which he considered to be extremely grave and tense due to the mounting and continuous repression of the Serbian regime, which has gripped the entire life in Kosova and has endangered all spheres of activity.

Chairman Rugova told the co-chairmen about the position of the Albanian side to the solution of the Kosova issue. Kosova, an independent and neutral state—open to Albania and Serbia—is an optimal solution to all in the region, Dr. Rugova said, adding that this option has been supported and verified by the people of Kosova through referendum and other acts of expressing their political will.

The flexibility of the policy of Kosovar Albanians is clearly seen in their readiness to accept a temporary international administration, which will avoid an open conflict, normalize life, and create conditions for a serious dialogue to resolve the Kosova issue, Chairman Rugova said.

At the beginning of the conversation, the co-chairmen of the international conference on former Yugoslavia, Owen and Stoltenberg, stressed that the international community, which has been very committed in stopping the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in preventing its renewal in Croatia, has not forgotten Kosova and its issue. The community attentively follows all the events there and is concerned about the continuous worsening of the situation. Owen and Stoltenberg expressed gratitude for the peaceful policy followed by Dr. Rugova and the Albanians of Kosova and showed interest in the possibility of initiating a dialogue between the Albanian and Serbian sides.

They stressed that a dialogue in Kosova is indispensable at a time when a dialogue has been introduced among the parties involved in the conflict in the other areas of crisis in the territory of former Yugoslavia. This dialogue will be supported by the international community and the Geneva conference.

Chairman Rugova stressed that the Albanian side is ready for pure dialogue as, in fact, since the beginning, it has favored a peaceful solution to the problem of Kosova through dialogue.

We are for a serious and equal dialogue with the mediation of a third international authorized party, Chairman Rugova said, stressing that we can conduct a dialogue about concrete issues such as education, health, social affairs, etc. In fact, Dr. Rugova added, the Geneva conference and the group of Kosova in its framework may assist in this direction.

Lord Owen and Thornwald Stoltenberg promised that the international conference on former Yugoslavia will continue closely to follow the situation in Kosova and support the political solution of its issue.

UK Opposes Secessionist Claims of Ethnic Albanians

LD0311223094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1915
GMT 3 Nov 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pristina, Nov. 3 (TANJUG)—The Government of Great Britain backs Yugoslavia and Serbia's territorial integrity and opposes claims to an independent state by ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija.

British Government envoy David Slynn made the statement Thursday in the talks with Kosovo and Metohija official Bosko Drobniak. A statement issued after the talks quoted Slynn as saying the international community also backed such a stand. Slynn urged a dialogue between the Serbian Government and representatives of ethnic Albanians in Serbia's southern province of Kosovo and Metohija.

The statement quoted Drobniak as saying by rejecting such an initiative, the ethnic Albanians had manifested their unwillingness to hold talks of any kind and to stop their boycott of Serbia and Yugoslavia. Drobniak said this was why many outstanding issues in the province had remained unsolved.

Boycotting the political life in Serbia and Yugoslavia, ethnic Albanian separatists set up their own state bodies and proclaimed the independent Republic of Kosovo, trying to secure international support through the internationalization of the Kosovo issue.

Ethnic Albanian separatist leaders have for decades been trying to detach Kosovo and Metohija from Serbia and Yugoslavia and to annex it to neighboring Albania, using even terrorist actions to achieve their goal.

Enterocolitis, Jaundice, Typhoid Fever Cases

AU0311180994 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] In three days, 24 people became infected with enterocolitis in Podujevo, and the cause has still not been discovered. Teams of experts have been examining water samples from the town water mains. However, the Republican Sanitary Inspection has already established that Podujevo water reservoirs have not been adequately insured and that the additional chlorination of drinking water is not being carried out. Despite being warned, the local enterprise has still not obtained chlorine and chlorination devices. As many as 250 cases of jaundice were registered in Kosovo-Metohija in October alone. Dr. Milan Parlic, head of the Epidemiological Service of the Pristina Health Protection Institute, told journalists today that the highest number of cases, 46, was registered in Djakovica, 34 in Pristina, and 22 in Kosovska Mitrovica.

Apart from jaundice, enterocolitis, an intestinal infection, is also raging in Kosovo-Metohija. In October alone, 1,500 cases of enterocolitis were registered and five of the sick people have died: two in Suva Reka and one each in Kosovo Polje, Gnjilane, and Urosevac. Apart from this, 17 cases of typhoid fever have been registered in Orahovac. A household epidemic of typhoid fever has been reported to the Pristina Health Protection Institute.

The cause is usually contaminated drinking water. It is assumed that the number of cases is considerably higher as a number of Albanians seek medical help in private hospitals and health centers owned by Albanians, who do not report cases to the Pristina Health Protection Institute.

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